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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER  
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY GOVERNMENT  
IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 
Yanarışık, Oğuzhan 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu 
 
November 2008 
 
The disastrous attacks on 11 September 2001 signalled the beginning of a new era 
within which more people believe that Islam is in conflict with the West and 
western values. Although the Islamic political identity was traditionally based on 
opposition to the West and the westernization in Turkey, rapprochement between 
the Turkish Islamists and western values occurred ironically in the same era. The 
establishment and the rise of Justice and Development Party (JDP) are seen by 
many observers as an evidence of this transformation in the position of Islamists 
towards the West. 
 
This thesis evaluates the impact of systemic interactions on the identity formation, 
interest construction, and thus foreign policy behaviours of JDP-led Turkey 
through constructivist lenses. In other words, it takes the changing international 
environment in the post 9/11 world as independent variable, within which 
international norms are interrogated, East-West perceptions are reconsidered and 
identities are reconstructed. On the other hand, it takes identity, interests and 
behaviors of JDP-led Turkey and other international actors as dependent 
variables. 
 
 
Keywords: Social Constructivism, Post-9/11 World, Justice and Development 
Party, Turkey-West Relations, Turkish Foreign Policy, European Union, United 
States of America, Middle East 
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ÖZET 
 
11 EYLÜL SONRASINDA ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ 
YÖNETİMİNDE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ ANALİZİ 
 
Yanarışık, Oğuzhan 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu 
 
Kasım 2008 
 
 
11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde gerçekleşen feci saldırılar, eskisinden daha fazla kişinin 
İslam’ın Batı ve batılı değerler ile çatışma halinde olduğuna inandığı yeni bir 
dönemin başlangıç sinyalini verdi. Türkiye’deki İslami siyasi kimlik geleneksel 
olarak Batı ve batılılaşma karşıtlığı üzerine kurulmuş olmasına rağmen Türk 
İslamcıları ile batılı değerler arasındaki yakınlaşma ironik olarak tam da bu 
dönemde gerçekleşti. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin (AK Parti) kuruluşu ve 
yükselişi pek çok gözlemci tarafından İslamcıların Batı’ya yaklaşımlarındaki bu 
dönüşümün bir kanıtı olarak görülmekte. 
 
Bu tez sistemik etkileşimin kimlik oluşumu, çıkar inşaası, ve buna bağlı olarak 
AK Parti yönetimindeki Türkiye’nin dış politika davranışları üzerindeki etkisini 
konstrüktivist lenslerle değerlendirmekte. Bir başka deyişle, 11 Eylül sonrası 
dünyada değişen uluslararası normların sorgulandığı, Doğu-Batı algılamalarının 
yeniden değerlendirildiği ve kimliklerin yeniden oluşturulduğu uluslararası ortamı 
bağımsız değişken olarak almakta. Diğer taraftan ise AK Parti yönetimindeki 
Türkiye’nin ve diğer uluslararası aktörlerin kimliklerini, çıkarlarını ve 
davranışlarını bağımlı değişken olarak incelemekte. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Konstrüktivizm, 11 Eylül 2001, Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, Türkiye-Batı İlişkileri, Türk Dış Politikası, Avrupa Birliği, Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri, Orta Doğu 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The general elections held on 3 November 2002 became a turning point in the 
history of Turkish democracy that was named by many writers as a “political 
earthquake.”1 Just after its election victory, Justice and Development Party’s 
(JDP) identity and its possible performance in government have been the subjects 
of fierce debates both at home and abroad. Although many observers used to 
identify JDP as an Islamic party that is simply one of those which represented 
political Islam in Turkey, JDP leaders consistently rejected such identification and 
named their ideology as “conservative democracy” since the establishment of 
their party.2 Although Tayyip Erdoğan, JDP’s leader, declared that Islam would 
not even be a point of reference for his party shortly before the establishment of 
JDP,3 some foreign observers argued that as a result of the elections, “for the first 
                                               
1
  For instance, E. Fuat. Keyman, “A political earthquake in Turkey: an analysis of the 
prospects of the  JDP government in Turkey,” (2003), http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-01-
08-keyman-en.html. 
2
  See Yalçın Akdoğan, AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım 
Dağıtım, 2004). 
3
  Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bir Dönüşümün Öyküsü. 
(İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001): 189, cited in William Hale,“Christian Democracy and the AKP: 
2 
 
time ever, Turkey had an elected Islamist prime minister with a rock solid 
majority.”4 
JDP’s performance as a single-party government was the other point that was 
wondered and discussed by all foreign and domestic observers from the very 
beginning of its term in government. Most of the observers were pessimist or at 
least cautious about the party’s possible foreign policy choices and especially its 
EU-stance. Those who warned the domestic and international society before the 
election in 2002 that Turkey has to say ‘Goodbye’ to the European Union if JDP 
wins the elections seemed to be taken seriously.5  
Contrary to initial expectations, performance of JDP in foreign policy issues and 
its Europeanized approach in this field have been welcomed by the majority of the 
observers in a short period of time. Especially, the unexpected progress of the 
Turkey-EU relations in the first years of JDP government confused the minds of 
those who expected a party that is perceived as a representative of political Islam 
to be an obstacle on the way that leads Turkey to Europe. Many observers started 
to think that JDP is “more actively and vocally committed to EU accession than 
any of its predecessors.”6 This trend gained speed by the positive developments in 
Turkey-EU relations and reached to its peak with the opening of negotiation 
process. The reform process at that time was perceived to be so successful that the 
                                                                                                                                
Parallels and Contrasts,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 293. 
4
  David Shankland, “Islam, Politics and Democracy in Turkey,” in Michael Lake, ed., The 
EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Milestone? (London: The Federal Trust, 2005), 54. 
5
  Tufan Türenç, “AKP ile AB’ye elveda,” Hürriyet, September 14, 2002. 
6
  Leda-Agapi Glyptis, “The Cost of Rapprochement: Turkey’s Erratic EU Dream as a 
Clash of Systemic Values,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 3 (2005): 403. 
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European Commission declared, “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the [Copenhagen] 
political criteria.”7 In other words, Turkey was accepted by the West, itself, as a 
country that achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities under a so-called 
pro-Islamist government. JDP’s economic agenda and performance has also been 
welcomed by the West. This has been reflected in the opinions of both private and 
public actors that openly appreciate what has been done in Turkish economy by 
the government after 2002 elections.  
However, the reform process has experienced a downward slope with the start of 
negotiations after the screening process.8 Although it has continuously been 
declared by the government leaders and officials that EU membership is a priority 
for the government, criticisms increased about the slowdown of the reform 
process. It is emphasised in many circles that Erdoğan gave up using his famous 
“Ankara criteria” in his speeches. In spite of a debate about the reasons of this 
situation, even those who are closer to the party circles have started to talk about a 
gap between the willingness in the first years of government and indolence in the 
last years about the reform efforts.9 This situation is expected to be reflected in the 
new 2008 progress report of the Commission. 
                                               
7
  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament-Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession (Brussels: European Commission, 2004): 3. 
8
  For a discussion on the reasons of the slowdown in the EU membership reform process, 
see Marcie J. Patton, “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has happened to the EU Process?” 
Mediterranean Politics 12:3 (November 2007). 
9
  İsmail Kapan, “Reform Paketleri,” Türkiye, October 30, 2008. 
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The changes in Turkish foreign policy under JDP government are perceived to 
imply much more than the improvement in relations with the EU. Rather, JDP’s 
foreign policy is generally described as “a significant break with the past” in 
terms of “foreign policy parameters and practices.”10 This break included 
Turkey’s approach that is closer to EU’s position more than ever about major 
developments in post-9/11 international system. Its resistance to unilateral U.S. 
action in Iraq, its willingness to actively cooperate in the democratization efforts 
in the Middle East region, its pro-active approach in solving the chronic problems 
in Cyprus, its support for diplomatic solution about Iran’s nuclear activities have 
been among the examples of Turkey’s Europeanized foreign policy approach 
under JDP government.  
This foreign policy and interesting nature of Turkey’s relations with western 
world under the so-called Islamist JDP is the puzzling situation that gave rise to 
not only this thesis but also other academic studies and political debates. The aim 
of this thesis is not to explain Turkish foreign policy under JDP government as a 
whole with all details and to analyse each and every factor that contributed to this 
policy. Because of the complexity of the process that leads to the action, it is 
almost impossible to give a perfect explanation to a state or human action. If the 
difficulty in understanding a single human being’s actions is kept in mind, it can 
be understood how difficult it is to comprehensively explain a much more 
complex state action in foreign policy that is a result of a construction process, 
                                               
10
  Seyfi Taşhan, “Foreword,” in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and  Seyfi Taşhan, eds., The 
Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ankara: Foreign Policy 
Institute, 2004), 7. 
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which involves the interaction of many human beings and other social entities, 
including other states. Thus, the claim of this thesis is to make a modest 
contribution to understanding and explaining Turkey’s relations with the western 
world by focusing on the generally neglected part of the explanation (i.e. systemic 
impacts) and analysing JDP’s role in this explanation as the single governing 
party whose policy choices are inseparable from Turkey’s policy choices as a 
state. 
Social constructivism is used in this thesis as the theoretical framework. Thus, this 
study pays special attention to the explanatory powers of non-material factors 
(namely identities, norms and perceptions) in explaining the change in Turkish 
foreign policy in the mentioned period. Alexander Wendt’s systemic analysis is 
given emphasis in this respect.11 Thus, this study can be identified as “state-
centric” in that sense.12 This is done in order to shift the attention to the identity 
and interest formation process at the systemic level, which seems to be ignored by 
neorealism that takes identities as constant and exogenously given and by 
neoliberalism that “either bracket[s] the formation of interests, treating them as if 
they were exogenous, or explain[s] interests by reference to domestic politics, on 
                                               
11
  Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power 
politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992); Alexander Wendt, “On the Constitution and 
Causation in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 24 (special issue, 1998); 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, “On the Via Media: a response to the critics,” Review of 
International Studies 26 (2000). 
12
  See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Alexander Wendt, “On the Via 
Media.” 
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the assumption that they are exogenous, although not necessarily constant.”13 
Another reason for this state-centrism is what Wendt uses in his studies: Although 
non-state actors are playing increasingly important roles in international politics, 
they do so only through state action.14  States still remain the main actors in the 
current international system that has the monopoly on the use of force. This 
situation does not seem to change, at least, in the middle term. 
Finally and more importantly, this position is taken in this dissertation also for 
some practical purposes, like narrowing the scope of the study and having a more 
feasible target. This target is to understand and explain the impact of some pre-
selected factors (systemic interactions and structure) on identity, interest 
formation and thus the foreign policy choices in the defined period instead of 
analysing all related factors. By this way, it is planned to prevent covering vast 
area of domestic politics that has been covered in detail in the existing literature.  
This enables this thesis to cover impacts of international system and developments 
that were highly ignored in attempts to understand Turkish foreign policy in the 
mentioned era.  “Bracketing” the impacts of domestic politics to a certain extent, 
which is widely used in the literature as the main independent variable to explain 
the changes in Turkish foreign policy under JDP government, and focusing more 
on the impact of the changes in international system on these policy shifts aim to 
                                               
13
  Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American 
Political Science Review 88:2 (1994), 384.; for a neoliberal example, see Andrew Moravcsik, 
“Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (1993). 
14
  Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Wendt, “On the Via Media.” 
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prevent a fruitless attempt to “problematize everything at once.”15 Thus, this study 
should not be seen as a competing effort against the analyses solely focusing on 
domestic politics in explaining identity, interest and policy construction. Rather, it 
is a complementary approach that can widen the scope of the academic work on 
the subject. 
On the other hand, this thesis accepts, like Wendt mentions, that domestic 
politics/factors have considerable impacts in shaping state identities, perceptions 
and thus behaviours, while paying prominent attention to the interaction between 
states, the international system and states themselves.16 It is also accepted, as has 
been observed after the crisis in the election process of Turkish president and 
closure case of JDP, domestic factors can become dominant on systemic factors. 
Thus, this study focuses more on the first years of JDP rule when systemic 
impacts play a prominent role in shaping JDP and its policies. In that context, the 
period after the start of EU membership negotiation process in October 2005, 
within which domestic issues dominated the landscape in Turkey is partly left 
outside of the dissertation.  This subject can be a good source for other academic 
studies in order to analyse the relationship between domestic and systemic factors. 
Constructivists are generally criticised for not applying their theoretical position 
in empirical research and for refraining from addressing “concrete problems of 
                                               
15
  Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 
International Organization 41:3 (1987), 364.; Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it,” 423; 
Wendt, “On the Via Media.,” 175. 
16
  Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 11. 
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world politics.”17 The answer to this criticism came with some empirical studies 
that focus on some specific situations and cases that aim to show that 
constructivism works in understanding and explaining IR much better than other 
theories. Instead of explaining every characteristics of IR in one study, they 
preferred to explain parts of it. Likewise, this study aims to show the 
appropriateness of constructivism in understanding and explaining the 
Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy under a so-called political Islamist 
party, especially in the first years, a situation that obviously cannot be explained 
in mere material terms. Instead of supporting a claim of a new orthodoxy against 
the mainstream, this thesis tries to contribute to efforts that try to open new paths 
of inquiry about Turkish foreign policy. This itself can be seen as a considerable 
step that can open the way for reconsideration of the strength and sufficiency of 
traditional explanations that rest solely on material factors. 
It can be criticised for covering the impact of a political party (i.e. JDP) in a 
dissertation that claims to make a systemic analysis that does not focus mainly on 
the domestic politics related part of the identity, interest and policy construction 
processes. However, the importance of this specific Party arises from the fact that 
it is the single ruling party with majority in the parliament during the period 
analysed in the thesis. This makes their preferences and actions inseparable from 
preferences and actions of Turkey as a state. Thus, instead of being merely part of 
domestic politics, contrary to other political parties or domestic actors, it is part of 
                                               
17
  Martha Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 32; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 4. 
9 
 
the state through which other domestic actors try to influence policies and change 
the system.18 For this reason, although everybody has their own ideas about 
Turkey’s identity, interests and appropriate foreign policy behaviours, JDP’s 
worldview, major perceptions and practical policy decisions deserve special 
attention as the single governing party that takes great responsibility in the foreign 
policy actions and their consequences in its term.  
JDP’s importance also arose from its dominant role against the previously strong 
state bureaucracy that traditionally created the “representations of the self and 
others” of Turkish state, which determined the foreign policy choices.19 Rather 
than being a simple operator that move according to the predefined ‘national-
interests,’ it challenged many taboos in the area of foreign policy formation and it 
considerably shifted away from traditional Turkish foreign policy.20 
More importantly, including JDP in the analysis of this study is an attempt to 
partially respond to a widely used criticism against constructivist studies that 
focus on the importance of social structures: “the neglect of domestic politics.”21 
JDP and its role provide a crucial link in the analysis between domestic politics 
and social structure, as an actor that is important at both domestic and structural 
levels. 
                                               
18
  Ibid., 9. 
19
  Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interest,” European Journal of International 
Relations 2, no.3 (1996): 281-283. 
20
  For some critical opinions about this ‘shift’, see Oya Akgönenç, “Evet, Sn. Başbakanım 
sormak zorundasınız!,” http://www.milligazete.com.tr/print.php?type=writers&id=9849; Devlet 
Bahçeli, “MHP 7. Olağan Büyük Kurultayında yaptığı konuşma,” 
http://www.mhp.org.tr/genelbsk/ gbskkonusma/2003/index.php?page=12102003. 
21
  Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World 
Politics 50, no.2 (1998): 332. 
10 
 
As can be understood from the theoretical framework it uses, this study rejects 
positivist ontology, which believes in the existence of a social world that is 
independent from human mind and can/should be discovered by social scientists.  
Rather, it is based on a “modernist” understanding of constructivist ontology by 
claiming that social world is dependent on human conscience and consists of 
unobservable factors as well as material ones.22  
This study does not reject the possibility of scientific knowledge and scientific 
explanation. In contrast to positivist and post-positivist approaches, it believes in 
the possibility and importance of both causal and constitutive relations that enable 
social scientists to highlight some regularity in the social world and to make 
projections for the future.23 At the same time, it refrains from making universally 
applicable claims and makes only “conditional” propositions.24 
This thesis evaluates the impact of systemic interactions on the identity formation, 
interest construction, and thus policy behaviours of JDP-led Turkey. In other 
words, its independent variable is the changing international environment in the 
post 9/11 world, within which international norms are interrogated, East-West 
perceptions are reconsidered and identities are reconstructed. On the other hand, it 
takes identities, interests and behaviours of JDP-led Turkey and western powers 
as dependent variables. 
                                               
22
  Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” 
European Journal of International Relations 3, no.3 (1997): 335. 
23
  Wendt, “On the Constitution and Causation.” 
24
  Wendt, “On the Via Media.,” 174. 
11 
 
Both primary and secondary resources are used for the research of this study. In 
addition to books and articles related to the topic, the research has made extensive 
use of primary sources such as newspaper articles, official statements and 
documents and the information received from semi-structured interviews that 
were conducted with scholars and politicians who are interested in the subject at 
theoretical and practical levels are used. The questions asked in the interviews 
focus mainly on foreign policy choices of JDP, post-9/11 international system, 
and the importance of non-material factors in understanding and explaining 
foreign policies. The sample for this study is non-random, and attempted to 
capture the views of potentially knowledgeable and influential persons: scholars 
and politicians. Hence, the answers do not represent the general public opinion.  
The second chapter of this thesis covers a general review of the literature on 
constructivism while clarifying the theoretical position held in this study. In order 
to prevent any confusion that can arise from the different usage of the term 
“constructivism” in the literature, the way the concept is used in this study is 
explained. The advantages and disadvantages of this theoretical position in 
understanding and explaining changes in foreign policies compared to other 
theories are evaluated. The impact of systemic values/factors on identities of 
nation-states and their foreign policy interests and behaviours are analysed in 
general terms. 
The third chapter focuses on the independent variable of the study, namely 
changing social reality of the international system in the post-9/11 world. 
12 
 
Substance of the core tenets of the system is evaluated with its material and social 
elements. The perceptions of the West (i.e. the United States and the European 
Union) related to the international structure after September 11 attacks and the 
interaction between the western agents and the international structure are 
analysed. 
The fourth chapter evaluates the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables and examines the systemic impacts on the identity, interest 
and foreign policy behaviour in the case of JDP-led Turkey. Within this 
framework, the JDP’s relations with the western powers and the international 
system are assessed. 
The fifth chapter takes Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East region as a case 
study. This part of the dissertation tests the applicability of constructivism in 
understanding and explaining foreign policy change in Turkey in post-9/11 world.  
Finally, the thesis concludes with the general evaluation of the success of 
constructivism in the thesis and the general observations are explained. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Social constructivism arose in 1980s and became a challenging alternative way of 
thinking in international relations literature against orthodox rationalist theories. 
However, its roots can be traced back to the 18th century with the works Italian 
philosopher Giambattista Vico with his belief in the historical world as the 
product of Man, while the natural world is made by God. Immanuel Kant is 
another ancestor of constructivism with his belief in the subjectivity of the human 
beings’ knowledge about the world that is filtered through human consciousness. 
Another forerunner of constructivism is Max Weber, who argues that “subjective 
understanding is the specific characteristic of social knowledge.”25 
Especially after the end of Cold War, constructivism gained popularity and has 
been seen by many as the new rival of the mainstream theories. It was celebrated 
as the new party of the third grand debate in IR theory. Its biggest contribution to 
the literature is generally argued to be its success in shifting the attention from 
                                               
25
  Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, eds., Introduction to International Relations 
Theories and Approaches, 3rd edit. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 164. 
14 
 
material factors to ideational factors in understanding and explaining the social 
world. It is generally described as a theory that emphasises the importance of 
commonly held (intersubjective) ideas and beliefs in shaping the social world that 
human beings are living in. Thus, rather than taking the social world as given, 
social constructivism is welcomed as a theoretical position that can explain the 
changes in it. By this way, it was seen as a challenging view, which rejects any 
truth claim that can be applied in all times and places and opens the way for 
analysing the active interaction between humans as agents and the social world as 
the structure. As a result, it was perceived as a new way to analyse the mutual 
construction process between agents and structures. 
All this being said, however, it is still very hard to talk about clarity and 
consensus on constructivism’s “nature and substance.”26 Confusion and debate 
seem to prevail in the literature about the characteristics and the place of 
constructivism in International Relations (IR) theory. Different authors use the 
term in different meanings and this makes it more difficult to understand what 
social constructivism really is. For instance, although Wendt insists on the need 
for clearly separating constructivism from postmodernism, Jackson and Sorensen 
list postmodernists among the critical wing of constructivism, while Adler 
identifies them as a wing of radical constructivism.27 Moreover, constructivist 
scholars themselves support different views in the name of constructivism. Thus, 
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scholars like Colin Hay argue that constructivists are “unified more by what they 
distance themselves from than what they share.”28 This situation necessitates 
clarification about the theoretical position taken in this thesis. 
In this chapter, firstly, the background and the common points that establish the 
basis of constructivism in IR theory are analysed. In the rest of the chapter, the 
‘systemic analysis’ that is mostly shaped by Alexander Wendt,  the relationship 
between identity and interest, the international norms and their diffusion processes 
are evaluated. 
 
2.1 Commonalities in Constructivism 
Emanuel Adler defines constructivism as “the view that the manner in which the 
material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on 
dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.”29 
However, this is only one of the various definitions of constructivism. Thus, with 
reference to Hay’s criticism, it seems more efficient to analyse what 
constructivists distance themselves from in the first place, in order to grasp the 
core characteristics of constructivism.30 As can be inferred from its widely used 
portrayal by Adler as the “middle ground,” constructivism seeks to distance itself 
from the opposing sides in IR theory, namely materialists versus ideationalists, 
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rationalists versus relativists, individualists versus stucturalists.31 The 
commonalities of constructivism are evaluated below by analysing the position it 
takes about these dichotomies in ontological and epistemological terms. In 
addition, its position in agent-structure debate is investigated in this section. 
 
2.1.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
The first issue that constructivists try to clarify themselves is ontology. This effort 
started with a criticism of neorealism that constructivism is known to position 
itself against. Its role as the ‘other’ in the constructivist analysis is so important 
that Jackson and Sorensen argue that neorealism is still the main rival of 
constructivism while there is a considerable room for cooperation with 
neoliberalism, international society theory and even some versions of neo-
Marxism.32 This unique role of neorealism can also be easily observed in Wendt’s 
widely cited book Social Theory of International Politics as he clearly states that 
he positions himself according to Waltz’s structural realism, namely as a critique 
of it.33 The most important reason for this seems to be the dominant position of 
neorealism in IR theory. 
Although it has a different place because of its belief in the causal power of norms 
and social learning, neoliberalism is also perceived in the same camp with 
neorealism for sharing its materialist ontology and core assumptions. 
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Its ontology is the main departure point of constructivism from this mainstream 
camp (i.e. neorealism and neoliberalism). In other words, its answer to a question 
like “What is out there in social world?” is different from mainstream theories. 
While a mainstream theorist’s answer includes only material factors that are 
completely outside the human control with its own laws, a constructivist reply is 
that there are both intellectual and material elements in the social world and all 
elements are dependent on human mind. In this respect, Adler defines 
constructivists as “mediativist[s]” in the sense that they accept the existence of 
reality out there and believe that this reality is “not determined solely by material 
reality” and is “also socially emergent.”34 
Moreover, for a constructivist, material elements have a secondary status, because 
they gain meaning only through intellectual processes. This enables the 
constructivists to believe in the possibility of change in the social world by 
conscious human efforts and to reject a constant, pre-given, and natural-like 
‘social world’ perception.  It can be argued that in a world described by 
constructivists, actions of social beings depend not only on physical constraints or 
individual preferences and rational choices, but also on shared knowledge, 
collective meanings and the rules, legitimacy of self, institutions, practices and 
even creativity.35 From a constructivist perspective, human beings “made” our 
social world “from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what [they] do 
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with each other and saying what [they] say to each other.”36 
The most famous declaration of constructivism’s different ontology is Wendt’s 
claim that “anarchy is what states make of it.”37 This claim challenges the 
mainstream from its roots by showing that even the most commonly-accepted 
concept in our social world is not given, natural and material. Although, Wendt 
himself accepts that there is anarchy in the international system, he argues that ”it 
is the interaction and intersubjective understandings of states which gives rise to 
the condition of anarchy.”38 
Another outcome of constructivism’s different ontology is its emphasis on the role 
of non-material factors, like norms, in shaping the social world. In the 
mainstream, realists argue that norms do not have a causal power, while neoliberal 
regime theory argues that norms have some influence in certain areas. However, 
even neoliberals believe that norms are parts of the “superstructure built by agents 
on a material base and have only regulative function.” On the other hand, 
constructivists claim that norms have not only regulative but also constitutive 
effects on identities, interests and behaviours of agents.39 
In their analyses, constructivists focus on the intersubjective beliefs (and ideas, 
conceptions and assumptions) that are widely shared among people. In other 
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words, “ideas need to be widely shared to matter; nonetheless they can be held by 
different groups such as organisations, policymakers, social groups and etc.”40 It 
should be emphasised that “intersubjective meaning is not simply an aggregation 
of the beliefs of individuals who jointly experience and interpret the world.” 
Instead, it exists “as a collective knowledge that is shared by all who are 
competent to engage in or recognize the appropriate performance of a social 
practice or range of practices.”41 The life of this kind of knowledge is much 
longer than individuals’ lives and is “embedded in social routines and practices as 
they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and 
workings.”42 Intersubjective meaning have structural characteristics that do not 
only constrain actors but also define their social realities. 
Although it is well-known for its rejection of purely materialist ontology, it should 
be emphasised that constructivism’s ontology is also different from 
postmodernism’s strictly idealist ontology that ignores the material elements in 
the social world and takes the “world only as it can be imagined or talked 
about.”43 As a “middle ground,” it believes in the coexistence of both material and 
social factors in the social world. 
This brings us to the second point that constructivists seek to clarify themselves: 
their epistemology. Their difference from postmodernists is noticeable in terms of 
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epistemology. In other words, constructivism’s answer to a question like “What 
can we (hope to) know about social reality?” is much closer to mainstream’s 
answer than postmodernism’s reply. Postmodernists reject the possibility of 
objective knowledge and thus, scientific study about social world. Moreover, they 
believe that “truth claims cannot be adjudicated empirically.”44 Although 
constructivists share the scepticism of post-modernists about the universally 
applicable law-like truth claims in social sciences and about the attempts to 
discover a ‘final truth’ about the world which is true across time and place, they 
accept the possibility of scientific analysis. This scepticism does not prevent them 
from making “truth claims about the subjects they have investigated...while 
admitting that their claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a 
complex world.”45 
For some scholars, like Steans and Pettiford, this acceptance of science comes 
from constructivists’ desire to “say something meaningful about the (social) 
world.”46 Whatever their desires are, constructivism, as Adler argues, has an 
epistemology “that makes interpretation an intrinsic part of social science and that 
stresses contingent generalizations,” which does not try to fasten up the 
understandings about social world.47 In other words, constructivism does not 
reject all truth claims and accepts the possibility of explaining social world in 
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some certain ways as well as understanding it.48 
However, this should not prevent anyone from recognising the differences 
between constructivism and mainstream in epistemological terms. Although they 
accept the possibility of science, constructivists reject mainstream’s claim to find 
the ‘truth’ for everyone and explain the social world in the same way with a 
scientist working on the laws of material world. Wendt underlines this difference 
by arguing that constructivism’s “propositions are conditional rather than 
universal.”49 
Although it has been welcomed by many as a challenging rival against the 
mainstream, constructivism has been criticised from both sides of the IR theory 
they try to bridge.50 In time, constructivism has been criticised for simply adding 
‘ideas and norms’ as other explanatory variables and accepting the ontological 
and epistemological arguments of rationalism without any considerable 
modification. Moreover, it has also been observed that social constructivism does 
not differ from rationalist theories about the methodology that it applies in 
practice. These factors cause questions to arise about its difference from the 
mainstream literature in reality. Postmodern scholars argue that social 
constructivism does not have a considerable difference from rationalism and it is 
not really questioning rationalism’s general assumptions. They claim that this was 
the main reason for social constructivism, in contrast to postmodernism, to be 
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welcomed by the mainstream scholars as a sufficiently ‘scientific’ approach that 
can be taken seriously. 
Constructivists are also criticised for being closer to one of the sides, although 
they claim to be on the middle ground. In this respect, Wendt’s arguments are 
criticised for being too close to rationalism.51 Wendt himself accepts that he is not 
clear as he was before about the difference between constructivism and 
rationalism and confesses that he changed his attitude and came closer to 
rationalism.52 
Last but not the least, constructivists are criticised for trying to “reconcile the 
irreconcilable.” The gap between rationalism and postmodernism is argued to be 
wider than constructivists think.53 
 
2.1.2 Agent-Structure Debate 
One of the most important points that should be taken into consideration in 
understanding constructivism is its position in the debate over the relationship 
between agents and structure. As Onuf defines, structure is a “stable pattern of 
rules, institutions, and unintended consequences.”54 Agents are the actors in this 
structure. According to Went, social structure includes three basic elements: 
shared knowledge, material resources, and practices; and these three elements are 
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interrelated. In this analysis, “material resources only acquire meaning for human 
action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded,” 
and it is their intersubjectivity what makes the ideas and structure social. He also 
emphasises that “social structure exists, not in actors’ heads nor in material 
capabilities, but in practices. Social structure exists only in process.”55 
From a constructivist perspective, as Wendt mentions, agent-structure debate 
arises from the fact that “human agents and social structures are, in one way or 
another, theoretically interdependent.”56  Especially with the rise of 
constructivism, this debate began to attract the attention in the literature on the 
nature of the relationship between agents and structures. In his influential article, 
Wendt analyses the perspectives of influential theories (namely, neorealism and 
world-system theory) that claim to make structural explanation of how states 
behave in the international system and defines constructivism’s approach. 
In his analysis, Wendt argues that there are two possible ontological positions 
about the issue: one of them is to accept either structure or agents are 
“ontologically primitive,” while the other one is to give them “equal and therefore 
irreducible ontological status.” He continues that both neorealism and world-
systems theory choose the first option. Neorealism accepts the agents, while 
world-systems theory takes the system as ontologically primitive. Wendt’s 
solution to the problem is to see agents and system as “co-determined” or 
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“mutually constituted.”57 
Wendt borrowed the concept of ‘structuration’ from Anthony Giddens in his 
study. Giddens uses the concept of ‘structuration’ to describe an interactive 
relationship between agents and structure. According to him, structures (i.e. the 
rules and conditions that guide social action) do not determine what agents do in a 
mechanical way, or vice versa.58 Rather there is a continuous interaction between 
them that shapes both sides. In other words, Giddens’ agents are not “structural 
idiots.” Instead, they consciously have their own constructed identities, structures 
and practices.59 However, it should not be ignored that there is no full 
independence for any agent. Thus, “full independence is a...friction, and 
sovereignty is a matter of degree.”60 In other words, “people make society, and 
society makes people” in a continuous two-way process.61 
This perception of ‘mutual constitution’ became one of the foundation stones of 
constructivism. Thus, constructivism is known for its criticism of mainstream not 
only for its materialism, but also for its methodological individualism.62 
Methodological individualism is described by Rhoads to be based on “the belief 
that society consists solely of its members.” In this view, the members “alone are 
real” and “individualism rules out social structures as supraindividual causes and 
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traces causal inferences to particular individuals in general.”63 
In continuation to this understanding, Adler argues that the main aim of 
constructivism is “to provide both theoretical and empirical explanations of social 
institutions and social change, with the help of the combined effect of agents and 
social structures.” By this way, constructivism tries to establish a bridge between 
individual agency and social structure.64 
 
2.2 Wendt’s ‘Systemic Analysis’ 
Wendt is a well-known constructivist who argues that constructivism should focus 
on the structure and take the state as the unit of analysis. Although he accepts that 
domestic politics is also important in constructing state identities, his focus is on 
the impact of international system on state identity. He accepts that non-state 
actors are increasingly involved in shaping the international system. However, 
states preserve a crucial role in his analysis as the means that other actors have to 
act through. Thus, for him, it is early for taking non-state actors as main unit of 
analysis. This is the basic reason for him to have a state-centric approach like 
Waltz. However, contrary to Waltz, he takes identities, norms and other non-
observable and non-material factors into consideration in explaining the social 
world. 
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Wendt starts his analysis by noting that he accepts some core assumptions of 
Waltz’s neorealism, although he has different reasons to do that. The most 
important assumption that he shares with Waltz is the importance of states in the 
current international system as the main actors that have the monopoly on the use 
of force. He also treats states as actors that have “identities, interests, 
rationality.”65 He also believes that “states are structures that exhibit macro-level 
regularities and these although dependent on individuals’ beliefs, are not 
explained by them.”66 This makes them the main unit of analysis for Wendt. 
However, contrary to neorealists who take the state for granted and not 
problematise it, Wendt believes that states are also social constructions. However, 
this does not prevent him from accepting that states are the main actors in today’s 
social world and will remain so at least in the near future.67 
Wendt also accepts that there is anarchy in the current international system. 
However, he does not take this situation for granted as part of nature. He claims 
that structures are not static, because they are continuously “reproduced and 
transformed by practice.”68 This claim leaves room for a change in the structure. 
Wendt also agrees with neorealists that today’s states most often define their 
interests in a self-interested manner. What he emphasises is the fact that this 
situation is not the natural result of statehood; rather it is “socially constructed and 
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historically contingent.”69 
Contrary to neorealism’s material structure understanding, Wendt stresses the 
intersubjective structure understanding that “leaves room for the emergent effects 
of material capabilities.”70 As a constructivist, Wendt believes in the existence of 
both material and social elements in social world and claims that: 
Yes, international politics is in part about acting on material 
incentives in given anarchic worlds. However, it is also about the 
reproduction and transformation -by intersubjective dynamics at 
both the domestic and systemic levels- of the identities and interests 
through which those incentives and worlds are created.71 
Wendt emphasises that his idealism is not that of “Pollyanna” or “Peter Pan.”72 
Like other constructivists, he argues that constructivism is not utopian and its 
analytical stance is neutral with respect to conflict and cooperation.73 
Wendt accepts that he sees “less opposition between rationalism and 
constructivism than” he did at the beginning of 1987.74 As can be understood from 
his other studies, Wendt’s problem with the mainstream is not epistemological, 
since he accepts science and causal explanation. Instead, his problem is about 
ontology. Thus, he does not suggest removing mainstream from the literature. 
Rather, he criticises what neorealism and neoliberalism neglects, instead of what 
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they do.75 
Alexander Wendt, with his famous systemic analysis, focuses on the impact of 
international environment on construction processes of identities and beliefs, 
contrary to some other constructivists who argue that domestic developments are 
more important in explaining changes in identities and beliefs. By this way, he 
shows his place in the debate about the importance of domestic politics and 
international environment in explaining the changes in social world. Thus, he is 
also called “systemic constructivist.”76 
 
2.3 Identity and Interest 
To place emphasis on the importance of national roles or identity perceptions in 
defining foreign policy choices of states is not a new practice that is unique to 
constructivists. In his article that dates back to 1970, Kal Holsti talks about and 
criticise IR theorists who make “references to national roles as possible causal 
variables in the operation of international systems, or in explaining the foreign 
policies of individual nations.”77 However, it is the constructivists who developed 
a comprehensive alternative to the mainstream and shifted the attention in the 
literature from material factors to non-material factors, like identity, in explaining 
national interest perceptions and foreign policy decisions. As Finnemore puts it, 
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constructivists opened a new way of scholarship by “developing a systemic 
approach to understanding state interests and state behaviour by investigating an 
international structure, not of power, but of meaning and social value.”78 
According to constructivists, states’ identities and interests are shaped by the 
“norms, institutions, and other cultural features of domestic and international 
environments.”79 Thus, Weldes argues that “national interest... is created as a 
meaningful object, out of shared meanings through which the world, particularly 
the international system and the place of the state in it is understood.”80 
From this constructivist framework, “interests and identities of actors,” as Wendt 
puts it, “emerge only in an interactive process.”81 In this process, identity has an 
important role in defining states’ interests. States, in their view, “do not have a 
‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; 
instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.” The 
actors may face some unprecedented situations that force them to re-construct 
their interests by constructing the meaning of their new environment. “The 
absence or failure of roles makes defining situations and interests more difficult, 
and identity confusion may result.” 82 
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Bukovansky argues that “analysis of the social construction of state identities 
ought to precede, and may even explain, the genesis of state interests.”83 In other 
words, state identity is the basis of interest. Thus, state identity is argued to 
precede state interests because “actors often cannot decide what their interests are 
until they know what they are representing- ‘who they are’ which in turn depends 
on their social relationships.”84 
The constructivists do not neglect the importance of domestic factors in shaping 
the identities of states. Even Wendt, as a systemic constructivist, accepts the 
importance of domestic factors by arguing that the way a state satisfies its 
corporate interests (namely, physical and ontological security, recognition as an 
actor, and development) is determined by the way it identifies itself in relation to 
others, “which is a function of social identities at both domestic and systemic 
level of analysis.” Wendt also accepts that “some state identities and interests” 
arise “primarily from relations to domestic society,” while others stem from 
international society. Thus, he agrees that “the content of national interest” is only 
partly shaped by “structurally constituted identities.” 85 
 
                                               
83
  Mlada Bukovansky, “American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the 
War of 1812,” International Organization 51 (Spring 1997): 209. 
84
  Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National    
Security,” 59. 
85
 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation,” 385-6. 
31 
 
2.4 International Norms and Their Diffusion 
There are various definitions of norm in the literature. However, it seems fair to 
argue that common position is close to accepting norms, as Finnemore puts is, as 
“shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of 
actors.”86 It is crucial to emphasize that norms are considerably different than 
ideas in this framework. Differently from the ideas, norms are always shared and 
social. They are also intersubjective and have clear implications in terms of 
behaviour.87 Thus, norms play an important role in constructivist analysis, and 
they are argued to “constitute social identities and give national interests their 
content and meaning.”88 Although there is almost a consensus on the fact that 
‘norms matter,’ there is still uncertainty about how and why they matter. This 
ambiguity stimulated several attempts by constructivist scholars to deal with the 
issue of norm diffusion. 
As Checkel mentions, there are two main approaches about the reasons for the 
agents to “comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international 
institutions.” The first one is the rationalist school that accentuates the importance 
of “coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives.” On the other 
hand, as the second group, constructivist school emphasizes “social learning, 
socialization, and social norms.”89 Thus, the latter group focuses on the social 
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processes that lead to norm diffusion from international level to national level. 
However, “the norms transfer process,” in Flockhart’s words, “is so complex and 
multifaceted that practically often prevents consideration of all the different 
factors that play a role in state socialization, and focus has in most cases been 
limited to the elite level.”90 
Socialization is an indispensable part of constructivist analysis. Because, as Onuf 
puts it, “social relations make or construct people -ourselves- into the kinds of 
beings we are.”91  There are various definitions of socialization in the 
constructivist literature. For instance, Stryker and Statham define socialization as 
a “generic term used to refer to the process by which the newcomer –the infant, 
rookie, or trainee, for example– becomes incorporated into organized patterns of 
interaction.”92  According to another definition, in Berger and Luckmann’s words, 
socialization is “the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into 
the objective world of a society or sector of it.”93 Thus, it can be argued that 
socialization provides society membership to those actors who take the 
intersubjective understandings of the society for granted.  
For a systemic analysis, ‘state socialization’ is the basic socialization type that a 
study should focus on. Although there are some debates, state socialization is 
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defined, in a general sense, as a process within which “states internalize norms 
originating elsewhere in the international system.”94 In other words, it can be seen 
as a process “that is directed toward a state’s internationalization of the 
constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international 
environment.”95 
However, the issue of state socialization becomes complicated because of the fact 
that “the meanings which objects, events and actions have for ‘states’ are 
necessarily the meanings they have for those individuals who act in the name of 
the state.”96 Thus, it can be argued that in order for a norm to become a state 
norm, those groups and individuals who act in the name of the state should 
internalize it. 
There are two main strategies for socialization in the literature. Fist one is “social 
influence” that promotes behaviours compatible with the norms by means of 
“distribution of social rewards and punishments.” Second one is “persuasion” that 
“encourages norm consistent behaviours through a social process of interaction 
that involves changing attitudes without use of either material or mental 
coercion.”97 
International organisations are important as agents that have considerable 
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influence on norm diffusion in the international system. In this respect, Finnemore 
claims, in her famous book, that “states may not always know what they want and 
are receptive to teaching about what are appropriate and useful actions to take.” In 
these cases, she continues, international organisations act as “active teachers with 
well defined lesson plans for their pupils.”98 The processes before the membership 
to these organizations play a crucial role in this respect. 
In her framework named “complex socialization,” Trine Flockhart talks about 
groups and individuals that are “intermediate agents” between the socializing 
agents and nations. These agents are constituted by those limited number of small 
groups or individuals in the socializing countries who are in direct connection 
with the socializing agent. They play a kind of bridge role between their domestic 
constituencies and the socializing agent. In some cases, these agents may not 
agree with the norms and just “communicate the socialization efforts to their 
domestic constituency.” However, in other cases, these agents may share the 
views of the socializing agent and act as “norm entrepreneurs in relation to their 
domestic constituency.”99 
Last but not the least; identity also has a crucial role in the diffusion of 
international norms. As it defines how a state perceives itself, identity is important 
in understanding why some norms matter more in some places.100 In other words, 
identities determine which norms are more likely to influence a particular state 
                                               
98
 Finnemore, National Interest in International Society, 11-2. 
99
 Flockhart, “'Complex Socialization',” 104-5. 
100
 See, Amy Gurowitz, “The Diffusion of International Norms: Why Identity Matters,” 
International Politics 43 (2006): 305-341. 
35 
 
with a certain identity (liberal, eastern, modern, European, Arab, American etc.) 
by means of intersubjective beliefs that define how that kind of state should be. 
The wider the gap between the domestic and international norms, the longer it 
takes the state to socialize in the international system. 
By using this theoretical framework, the next chapter assesses the norms that 
dominate the post-9/11 world. Thus, the chapter mainly focuses on the most 
important systemic actors (i.e. USA and EU) and the interaction processes 
between these agents and the structure. Special attention is paid on their 
perceptions about themselves, the attacks and the international system. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 POST 9/11 WORLD 
 
 
 
 
As in the cases of important turning points in the history, 9/11 is accepted to open 
a new era in international relations. After the attacks, some emotional reactions 
followed that nothing will be the same anymore. Some cautious observers claimed 
that time is necessary to calculate the impacts of the event.101 However, there was 
almost a consensus on the fact that the event is much more than a mere terrorist 
attack and will have long-term consequences.  
 
3.1 September Attacks as a System Level Development 
In this thesis, 9/11 is taken as a “system level development,” which is defined by 
Aras as an event that is “an international happening which does produce direct 
conclusions on the founding principles and institutions of the whole system that... 
includes several well-known issues such as power hierarchy in the system, the 
role and policies of hegemon, general trends etc...” In this sense, 9/11 is analysed 
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in this study as a unique event in its influence on world politics in the post-Cold 
War world that “raised many questions” about “the structure and agents of world 
politics.” 102 
There are various studies on this kind of systemic events. For instance, in their 
article on the changing world after the collapse of Soviet Union, Koslowski and 
Kratochwil talk about “fundamental changes” in the international system that 
occur “when actors through their practices, change the rules and norms 
constitutive of international interaction.” In continuation, they add that these kinds 
of changes occur when beliefs and identities of domestic actors and the 
rules/identities that are constitutive of their political practices are adjusted.103  In 
another study about this topic, Robert Gilpin argues that systemic change occurs 
within the system rather than a change of the system itself and refers to the 
“changes in the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and 
the rules and the rights embodied in the system.”104 For many observers, this is 
exactly what happened after September 11 attacks. 
According to Aras, one can talk about a “change in the imagination of world 
politics and international relations” after September 11 attacks. In this respect, 
Aras insists that 9/11 at least changed “our conceptual understanding of world 
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politics” and forced us to find “new analytical methods and tools to have a better 
understanding of its transforming nature.”105  In this world, one can talk about a 
new set of meanings and symbols that are created after the attacks and influenced 
our perceptions about the event. 
On September 11, 2001, with the help of the advancements in communication 
technologies, billions of people received enormous amount of information about 
the attacks in real time. However, at the end of the day, everybody had his or her 
own story to tell about the event. 
A value-free description of the 9/11 may probably be as follows: 
On the 11th of September 2001, several people took four airplanes under control 
on the Northern part of American continent. Two of these planes crushed into two 
tall buildings in the city named New York, one of them crushed into another 
building in the city named Washington, and the other one crushed into the ground. 
Two tall buildings collapsed and nearly 3.000 people died. 
Any contribution to this story is very likely to be influenced by ideas, values and 
perceptions of the storyteller and reflect a constructed intellectual background. 
One possible version of such a story may start as follows: 
On the 11th of September 2001, the black day for the humanity, several Middle 
Eastern radical Islamist terrorists hijacked four civilian planes in the U.S. 
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airspace. In order to achieve their evil plans, they consciously crushed two planes 
into the World Trade Center towers that represent the economic power of U.S. 
and one plane to Pentagon that represents the American military might. The other 
plane crashed into the ground as a result of heroic efforts of the passengers before 
it reached to its target. Over 3000 innocent human beings died in the attacks, 
many of whom were American citizens. This terrorist act is not merely an attack 
to the American people; rather it is a dangerous blow to the free and civilized 
world and a declaration of war to democracy-loving peoples of the world. 
On the other hand, another possible story may be as follows: 
On the 11th September 2001, a group of heroes in the jihad against infidels 
successfully took control of four U.S. planes. They crushed the planes to their 
targets: World Trade Center, the symbol of western imperialism and exploitation, 
and Pentagon, the center of cruelty of American evil plans all over the world. 
Some infidels and their allies died in the attacks. This day is an important step in 
our war against the infidels and their unjust order. This day is just an example of 
the consequences that infidels have to face as a result of their actions. 
There are limitless numbers of various stories about the day, most of which are 
less emotional and ideological than the ones above. However, one fact is 
important to mention at this point that the behaviours of the actors that followed 
9/11 were mostly shaped by these differences in stories. How people perceived 
the event mostly shaped the following events and developments. 
40 
 
In one sense, it is important to note that this day was not enough on its own to 
explain the post-9/11 world. There are various cultural, sociological, economic, 
historical, political, or even psychological reasons behind the attacks that might be 
the subject of scholarly work. However, in this thesis, the focus is on the impacts 
of the attacks as a systemic development and the reactions of the major 
international actors.  
This study is based on an assumption that the international environment and actors 
shape each other in a continuous process of construction. Thus, the interaction 
between agents and the structure is crucial. Perceptions of the agents about 
themselves, the attacks and the international system have played a decisive role in 
shaping the post-9/11 world. Obviously, as the only superpower in the current 
system, USA’s reaction necessitates special attention in this respect. Its 
perceptions and reactions have had decisive impacts in shaping the international 
environment after 9/11 attacks. Thus, many observers believe that 9/11 “has so 
fundamentally transformed America and its relations with the rest of the world 
that it will either directly or indirectly impact every corner of the globe.”106 
Another actor whose perceptions and actions should be taken into consideration in 
evaluating post-9/11 world is the European Union. This chapter will evaluate the 
post-9/11 world and these actors in this world by focusing mainly on the non-
material factors. 
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3.2 The United States after 9/11 
It was shocking to see the attacks on TV for U.S. citizens who felt safe in their 
territories that had not been attacked by a foreign power since the American War 
of 1812. However, there was confusion about the expectations on the reaction 
from U.S. administration in response to the attacks. There were some observers 
who expected 9/11 to provide the necessary stimulus for U.S. to soften its conduct 
of diplomacy. For instance, in his article written before the American invasion in 
Afghanistan, Steve Smith argues that a more multilateral US foreign policy should 
be expected in post-9/11 world.107 Yet, the formal reaction was harsh and 
composed of a mixture of shock, sadness, and anger. September 11, 2001, is 
officially described as “a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history 
of the United States.”108 American policymakers and media pundits almost 
immediately described the 9/11 attacks as an act of war.  
Bush administration found dramatic and mainly emotional reasons for America to 
be attacked by terrorists: In President Bush’s words, “America was targeted for 
attack, because [Americans] are the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity 
in the world.”109  However, many do not believe that this is the real reason that 
lies behind the attacks. Believing in this reason is argued to lead misperception 
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about the roots of terror and become the biggest obstacle in the fight against 
global terror. However, this perception became one of the main arguments that is 
widely used by U.S. policymakers after 9/11. In the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks Colin Powell declared: “Once again, we see terrorists, people who don’t 
believe in democracy...”110  Brian Roehrkasse, spokesman for Homeland Security, 
argued in a similar way that “terrorists hate our freedoms. They want to change 
our ways.”111 
The post 9/11 world from an official American eye is not safe for anybody. There 
are two clear-cut groups of people in this world: the good ones and the bad ones. 
If you are a good one, you are the target of terrorists. George W. Bush made this 
point clear by arguing that “the threats we face are global terrorist attacks. That’s 
the threat. And the more you love freedom, the more likely it is you’ll be 
attacked.”112 If you are among the bad ones you are the target of the world’s only 
superpower and its good allies. Thus, nobody is immune from threat and 
insecurity in post-9/11 world from this perspective. In his speech to the Joint 
Session of Congress on 20th September 2001, President Bush declared that 
everybody has to make a choice in the new war on terror by presenting his famous 
options: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”113 By defining 
Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an axis of evil, Bush reinforced this image of a 
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world divided between good and evil. 
These kinds of analyses became so popular that some observers even started to 
think that the rhetoric of American, British and Israeli experts about 9/11 has 
become as dangerous as the terror itself.114 Within this environment, the new 
official U.S. policy regarding post-9/11 world is shaped with the influence of so-
called neo-cons in the Bush administration. 
 
3.2.1 Neo-cons and the Bush Doctrine 
The influence of neo-cons in the making of U.S. Foreign policy has been subject 
to fierce debates especially after the September 11 events. Their belief in the 
importance of military power and unilateralism in maintaining the superpower 
role of USA in the international system, determined the reaction of U.S. after the 
attacks. 
Conservatives have traditionally been highly involved in policy-making processes 
either directly through their members in the administrations or indirectly by 
means of influential think tanks. The Project for the New American Century is a 
good example for such involvement. As can be guessed from its name, it was 
established in 1997 with the aim of promoting American identity as the global 
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leader by applying “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.”115  
Its first considerable action was the letter written by its members to President Bill 
Clinton on Iraq in 1998, three years before the 9/11 attacks. In the letter, members 
suggest that removing Saddam Hussein by using military force should “become 
the aim of American foreign policy.” Moreover, they claim that the administration 
should give up its insistence on diplomacy that, in their words “is clearly failing.” 
They argue that there is no need for a new UN resolution or a decision from UN 
Security Council in order to take military steps in the region.116 The interesting 
fact about the letter is that seven out of eighteen authors of the letter took 
important seats in Bush administration and took lead in the creation of U.S. 
foreign policy after the attacks. These authors and their positions in the Bush 
administration are as follows: 
Donald Rumsfeld           Secretary of Defence 
Paul Wolfowitz         Deputy Secretary of Defence 
Richard Perle            Pentagon Policy Advisor 
Zalmay Khalilzad        Special Presidential Envoy of Afghanistan 
Richard L. Armitage          Deputy Secretary of State 
Elliott Abrams            National Security Council 
John Bolton            Under Secretary Arms Control & International Security 
 
Francis Fukuyama and Robert Kagan are also among the authors. This fact itself 
raises questions about the importance of 9/11 as an opportunity that is used by 
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neo-cons to apply the plans they prepared much before the attacks. 
The Project members were among those who first congratulated President Bush 
for his “admirable commitment to lead the world to victory in the war against 
terrorism.”117 They claim that any strategy against terrorism should be determined 
to remove Saddam Hussein from power, “even if evidence does not link Iraq 
directly to the attack.” They also argue that U.S. administration should “fully 
support [USA’s] fellow democracy,” Israel. Moreover, they warn the 
administration not to hesitate “in requesting whatever funds for defense are 
needed.”118 
Project Members consistently insist on three main points that established the basis 
of post-9/11 foreign policy priorities of neo-cons: removing Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq, fully supporting Israel and increasing the defence budget and 
enlarging the armed forces.119 This insistence is so high that Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol even suggested their “old friends” Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to 
resign for not being able to convince the White House to increase defence 
budget.120 
In their analysis, Schmitt and Donnelly claim that the Bush Doctrine, which is 
highly influenced by the ideas mentioned above, is based on three main elements. 
Firstly, he advocates an active American global leadership that fights against its 
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enemies in all corners of the world. Secondly, he prioritizes regime change in 
rogue regimes, namely Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Finally, he “sees in the war 
[against global terror] not just danger but an opportunity to spread American 
political principles, especially into the Muslim world.” In addition to describing 
what Bush Doctrine is, the authors also explain what it is not. For them, Bush’s 
doctrine is neither close to “multilateralism of Clinton that cares a lot about UN 
system and expects too much from peace processes. Nor is it his father’s balance 
of power realism.”121 
Many analysts, like John Judis, argue that not only Bush administration and neo-
cons but also conservative Republicans in general have “an unbroken record of 
failure” in terms of foreign policy decisions.122 The most popular criticism in this 
respect is about Bush administration’s ignorance of international community and 
legitimacy concerns. This ignorance arose mostly from the over-confidence about 
the ability of USA in acting on its own. For instance, Richard Perle claims in his 
televised interview that the “U.S. did not need any coalition to win the war against 
terrorism” and he adds it is better for the U.S. to “act alone” rather than being 
“held back by the requirement to hold the coalition together.”123  
During its war against terror, Bush administration refused any help even from 
NATO that invoked its Article V for the first time ever and accepted 9/11 as an 
attack on all of its members. Wolfowitz said that this help is not necessary 
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because “the mission would define the coalition.”124 This approach, as Aras 
mentions, is criticised for “de-legitimiz[ing] the UN system and international law, 
and most of all, consolidat[ing] the widespread idea of a Western double standard 
toward the rest of the world.”125 In this respect, Hirsh argues that the new Bush 
Doctrine is “used to justify a new assertiveness abroad unprecedented since the 
early days of the Cold War.” By this way, he continues, it “redefined U.S. 
relationships around the world.”126 
Bush administration is also highly criticized for its unconditional support for 
Israel. For many analysts, it is almost impossible to establish stability in the 
Middle East without finding a fair solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush’s 
plan to transform the region “through the fire of violence” seems to fail in Iraq 
and is not likely to work anywhere. On the contrary, his vision is argued to 
worsen the situation in the Middle East and strengthen terrorist organizations by 
creating a fruitful environment for them.127 Seeing only one side of the coin and 
perceiving Israel as a “fellow victim of terrorist violence” that “is targeted in part 
because it is [America’s] friend, and in part because it is an island of liberal, 
democratic principles - American principles - in a sea of tyranny, intolerance, and 
hatred”128 disables the U.S. administration from being part of the solution. 
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3.2.2 The Fight against Terror and the War in Iraq 
Threat perceptions have had a crucial importance in shaping the reactions of 
international agents in the post-9/11 world. It became common among observers, 
especially in the USA, to argue that September 11 attacks proved the existence of 
a new type of threat that has been mentioned for various times before: “a truly 
global terrorist group, engaged in an all-embracing conflict with the USA and its 
allies.”129  However, even in this environment, there were some opposing voices 
that put the blame on U.S. and its previous policies rather than taking some 
fanatics as the scapegoats. Some commentators like Kabbani argue that U.S. has a 
considerable responsibility in the process that created the so-called Islamist 
terrorism. And the most obvious proof for this responsibility is claimed to be its 
support to Afghan mujahedeen, including Osama bin Laden himself, against 
Soviets.130 Some analysts even warned U.S. Administration that “retaliation” is a 
“trap” that was laid down by Osama bin Laden for George W. Bush. 131 
However, the Bush administration was determined to retaliate with military force 
and declared that a war is going to be waged. However, reasons for the war and 
tactics planned by the U.S. administration turned out to be wrong. Although, the 
quick success in Afghanistan helped to create an image of a strong American 
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supremacy and the early stages of Iraqi war seemed to support this image, the 
obvious failure in Iraq turned out this image at the end. After more than five years 
since President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq in front 
of a “mission accomplished” banner, conflict and chaos prevails in Iraq. Al Qaeda 
and other terrorist organizations seem to be more powerful than ever in the region 
where American troops claimed to bring democracy. Nobody, including President 
Bush himself and his administration knows how to solve the problem. Almost all 
analysts agree on the fact that after nearly seven years since September 11 attacks, 
“the world is a more dangerous place, not safer.”132 The Iraq Study Group starts 
its report with the following sentence: “The situation in Iraq is grave and 
deteriorating.”133 After this failure in the war against global terror, especially in 
Iraq, reasons and the tactics of the war became extremely questionable.134 Finally, 
in 2007, General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, admitted “There is 
no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq, to the insurgency of Iraq.”135 All 
these facts raised questions about the health of the perceptions of U.S. 
administration about the post-9/11 world. 
One of the most important reasons for USA to invade Iraq was the so-called 
WMD stockpile of the Saddam administration. With some photographs taken 
from the satellites, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell tried to convince other 
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United Nations Security Council members for the urgency to act.136 However, 
American troops could not find any of them. Critics claim that Bush 
administration manipulated opinion both inside and outside USA. Scott Ritter, a 
chief weapons inspector in Iraq for the UN, writes in a newspaper article that they 
“were never able to provide 100 percent certainty regarding the disposition of 
Iraq’s proscribed weaponry,” while they “did ascertain a 90-95 percent level of 
verified disarmament. In direct contrast to these findings,” he continues, “Bush 
administration provides only speculation” without any detailed information. 137 
Another reason was Saddam regimes connection with the terrorist organisations, 
including Al Qaeda. However, in their famous report, September 11 Commission 
could not find any evidence of a “collaborative operational relationship” between 
Iraq and Al-Qaeda.138 However, it claimed that a meeting between a senior Iraqi 
intelligence officer and Bin Laden is a proof of an evil connection between the 
terrorist organisation and the Iraqi government.139 This evidence seems pretty 
weak when one considers the meetings between American officials including 
Donald Rumsfeld with Saddam Hussein, the leader of an evil regime. Moreover, 
the relationship between Bush administration and Laden family necessitates close 
attention at this point.140 
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The main reason in the failure of Bush administration in the Iraqi war is at the 
roots of its actions: its (mis)perceptions about the military capability of USA and 
the demographic, cultural, social and political situation in Iraq. The way the war is 
waged became highly criticised. Bush administration is blamed for not making 
feasible calculations about abilities of USA and probably making “the most self-
defeating decision ever made by an American” administration.141 Paul Wolfowitz 
claimed that the force necessary to bring peace and stability to Iraq need not be 
larger than the force necessary to invade it. This argument proved to be wrong. 
Now, those who support the war believe that more and more troops are necessary 
in order to establish stability in Iraq.142 Likewise, the American plans to establish 
stability in a short period of time burnt in the fire of ethnic conflicts. 
Analysts argue that U.S. administration should learn its lesson from the problem 
they face in Iraq and think twice before using military force without taking all 
possible political steps.143 However, neo-cons insist that Bush administration 
chose the best option after the attacks.144 For instance, there are still some strong 
pro-war neo-cons like Robert Kagan who insist on the necessity of using military 
option in the case of Iran in spite of its failure in Iraq. The only likely reason for 
them to abandon or postpone such an option is the lack of availability of troops to 
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use.145 
The place of international norms in the eyes of neo-cons also necessitates special 
attention. Although international values may have a place in their analyses, at the 
end of the day, they are just some burdens that USA should get rid of, if it is 
necessary. For instance, one of the most prominent supporters of the war in Iraq, 
Robert Kagan, accepts that international legitimacy matters. However, he believes 
that U.S. administration did the right thing by not really caring about such 
legitimacy. Because, in his view, U.S. would have never acted, if it had searched 
for this legitimacy. Yet, even Kagan accepts that “there are many legitimate 
criticisms to be made about America’s conduct of the war.”146  
 
3.3 The European Union after 9/11 and Transatlantic Relations 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Europeans, like the rest of the world, 
did not hesitate from fully supporting the USA and condemning disastrous 
terrorist act.147 They indicated a strong solidarity is necessary to heal the wound 
created with the attacks. Even the French public that is well-known for its anti-
American sentiments declared its wholehearted support to their American fellows. 
The monumental sentence that became the symbol of this support came from the 
popular French newspaper Le Monde in its front-page editorial: “We are all 
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Americans now.”148 
The threat perception of the Union has become similar to that of the USA after the 
attacks. Now, like U.S. administration, EU officially defines terror as the biggest 
global challenge that Europeans have to face.149 Thus, without any doubt, EU 
expressed its willingness for solidarity with the American people in their fight 
against terror after the attacks and supported the military operation under NATO 
command in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda established bases. However, the crisis 
in transatlantic relations came with the discussions about an operation in Iraq 
possibly without any mandate from any international organisation including 
NATO. 
The tension increased with the reciprocal official declarations that blamed the 
other side. It reached its peak with U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s 
briefing within which he named those European countries that did not support an 
invasion in Iraq, mainly France and Germany, as the “old Europe.”150 
The rapid success in Afghanistan increased the courage of USA in its ability to act 
alone, if it is necessary. Astonished with the early success of U.S. troops, some 
analysts warned the European leaders that Europe’s importance in the eyes of 
American policy makers is much less after 9/11 than its level in the last half 
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century. This, according to Wallace, forced Europeans to accept the fact that they 
have no more choice than supporting American policies without being involved in 
the processes that lead to those policies.151 
In the early stages of Iraqi war, as in the example of Robert Kagan, some analysts 
believed that US proved its ability to “respond to the strategic challenges around 
the world without much help from Europe.”152 Kagan went further in this belief 
and argued that the opinions and statements of the EU do not have more 
importance in the eyes of Americans than those of other groups of states like 
ASEAN or the Andean Pact. With confidence, Kagan warned American leaders to 
“realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of 
constraining the United States.”153 
Many Europeans argue that U.S. administration became blind with the American 
power and fallen into a trap of unilateralism that is characterised by an 
“instinctive refusal to admit to any political restraint on its action... placing itself 
above international law, norms and restrains when they do not suit its 
objectives.”154 
As it is observed more obviously after the war in Iraq, Europeans criticize 
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Americans for overemphasizing the importance of political and military 
dimensions of international issues, while Americans criticize Europeans for caring 
too much about the role of diplomacy and economic aid packages in international 
politics.155 As Akşemsettinoğlu mentions, the disagreements between USA and 
EU are not limited to issues related to Iraqi war. Rather, the list is much longer: 
“Kyoto Global Warming Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Multilateral 
Land Mines Treaty, relations with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a 
number of international trade issues.”156 What Iraqi War did was to put light on 
the cracks that already existed in transatlantic relations. 
While some observers believe that big cracks became visible in Western world 
(namely transatlantic community) after 9/11, some others believe that such a 
world never existed as it is imagined. The former group argues that the 
disagreement between U.S. administration and European leaders on the Iraqi issue 
is the “biggest surprise after 9/11.”157 On the other hand, the latter group claims 
that 9/11 awakened those who wished to see a united West and showed that 
“strategic perceptions of the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean differ 
considerably.”158 
As an example, Kagan starts his book with a strong assertion that “It is time to 
stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the 
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world, or even that they occupy the same world... On major strategic and 
international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus.” Kagan believes that transatlantic partners differ from each other in terms 
of their “national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and 
fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies.”159 
According to Kagan Muslim fundamentalism cannot be compared with the Soviet 
threat as a motive that forced Americans and Europeans to “prove (themselves) 
unified and coherent.”160 He adds that whereas “once the United States risked its 
own safety in defence of a threatened Europe’s vital interests, today a threatened 
America looks out for itself in apparent and sometimes genuine disregard for what 
many Europeans perceive to be their moral, political, and security interests.”161 
Neo-cons do not seem to have learned any lessons from the situation in Iraq. They 
believe that solution is sending more troops to Iraq and spending more on defence. 
They do not accept any criticism about the legitimacy of the war in Iraq or the 
actions of the U.S. administration. They harshly criticize reports that raise 
questions about the U.S. foreign policy after the September 11 attacks. For 
instance, they do not approve the September 11 Commission’s Report that does 
not provide enough reasons to legitimize the war in Iraq. Daniel McKivergan, 
deputy director of the Project for the New American Century, argues that “sloppy 
September 11 Commission staff report... and biased media coverage” prevent 
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people from seeing the “unquestionable” ties between Saddam regime and 
terrorist organizations.162 
However, after the war in Iraq each party has to pass through a period of 
reflection within which they can make calculations about their previous 
perceptions, interests, and related actions. 
For the part of U.S. administration, the failure in finding a solution for the 
situation in Iraq seems to have shown the importance of diplomacy, as in the cases 
of its approach towards Iran and North Korea. It also shows the importance of 
establishing a coalition like the one in the first Gulf War in 1991. Moreover, its 
perception about the roots and causes of global terror and the ways to fight against 
it became questionable. 
For the European part, the negative results of its failure to achieve integration in 
political and military matters became very obvious after its inability to influence 
post 9/11 developments, especially U.S. actions in Iraq. This situation also led to a 
new process within which EU questions its identity and the role it wants to play in 
the future. 
As the former French President Jacques Chirac puts it, each side seem to have 
understood that world crises cannot be addressed “by one nation acting alone on 
the basis of its own interests and judgments... Any crisis situation, regardless of its 
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nature, in any part of the world, is of concern to the whole international 
community.”163 In continuation to this understanding, any contribution in this 
respect should be welcomed with appreciation. The situation in the Middle East 
proves the failure of combating terrorism solely with material means. 
Many analysts believe that Huntington’s thesis, which claims that the “clash of 
civilizations” will happen, is likely to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, if no measure 
is taken. The primary battlefield for preventing such a conflict seems to be the 
minds and hearts of people.  
 
3.4 Core Tenets of the EU and US-led International Community 
In spite of all disagreements in the transatlantic relations, it is still fair to talk 
about a community that is comprised of European and Northern American 
countries what Schimmelfenning calls “Western international community,” while 
Flockhart names “Euro-Atlantic community.”164 This community seems to 
survive the problems faced after 9/11. Both parties try to heal the wounds of the 
crisis situation in the relations. Commonalities, instead of differences, have 
become more prevalent in the speeches of the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean. It has become common again to give reference to “democracy, individual 
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liberty and the rule of law” as the basic principles that “the freedom, common 
heritage and civilization” of the peoples of transatlantic community are founded 
on.165  Opposition in Europe against comments that describe the USA as a force 
for good, instead of evil has decreased. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
has become less marginal in claiming that “for all their faults, and all nations have 
them, the US are a force for good; they have liberal and democratic traditions of 
which any nation can be proud.”166 
There are still considerable opposition against “the rhetoric of shared values” that 
is seen as “an exploitation of history for present purposes, deployed by one side or 
another as circumstances dictate.”167 However, after the disappointment in both 
Europe and USA about the current situation in the international system, it has 
become relatively common to argue that transatlantic relations have no alternative 
or substitution. More people, like Javier Solana, started to believe that Europe is 
the only global partner of USA, and vice versa.168 Many analysts argue that, as 
Jose Manuel Barroso, European Commission President, puts it “EU-US relations 
have strengthened considerably [in] address[ing] common economic, political and 
environmental challenges... with shared values and interests.”169 These arguments 
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have been supported in the last years with the actual developments in transatlantic 
relations that became possible with the existence of commonalities in perceptions 
about post-9/11 world in both Europe and the USA. 
Even if this approach seems too optimist, there is still some room for 
commonality arguments that almost everybody can accept. These commonalities 
in the Euro-Atlantic community may be described as follows: 
 
3.4.1 Common Threat Perceptions and Security Agendas 
Like its precedent in 2002, the introduction to the 2006 National Security Strategy 
of the United States reveals the ongoing importance of September 11 in the 
outlook of what threatens national security. “America is at war. This is a wartime 
national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of 
terrorism fuelled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed 
to the American people on September 11, 2001.”170 An example of the clear 
continuity in policy since September 11 is the obvious way in which the 2006 
National Security Strategy only serves to complement the defining 2002 National 
Security Strategy. 
One important point that is neglected in many analyses about the current situation 
in transatlantic relations is the similarity between American and European 
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perceptions about the global threats that should be dealt with in the new 
international environment. Although their language and the solution suggestions 
are different, it does not seem wrong to argue that the EU capitals share similar 
concerns about the global challenges that should be addressed in the post-9/11 
world. One of the most obvious examples of this approach is the European 
Security Strategy that was adopted by the European Council on December 12, 
2003. This strategy paper has become a milestone in determining the EU’s 
common foreign policy after 9/11 by reflecting the threat perceptions of the Union 
and defining its security priorities.  
It is possible to argue that transatlantic partners share a considerably wide basis 
about their views on the way to fight against these threats. Both sides seem to 
have understood that they need each other in this effort. More analysts emphasize 
the need to combine American hard power with the European soft power in order 
be successful now. European leaders already took concrete steps by declaring 
their willingness to “share in the responsibility for global security and in building 
a better world.”171 This offer is also something that most Americans cannot reject, 
especially after the failure they have faced as a result of American unilateralism in 
Iraq and in the war against global terror. 
Moreover, American and European leaders agree on the belief that the challenges 
in the post-9/11 world are different from traditional threats they faced during the 
Cold War. They commonly claim that “the first line of defense will often be 
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abroad” and the “best defense is a good offense” in this new world.172 Last but not 
the least; they share similar views about the importance of the type of governance 
in the third world countries, especially in the Middle East. In order to fight with 
the root causes of the threats arising from these countries, they both believe in the 
vitality of promoting stable and democratic regimes. 
 
3.4.2 The Rise of Identities 
Another core tenet of this new international structure is the increasing importance 
of identities of the actors within the system. Within this novel environment, major 
agents in the structure, mainly the EU and USA, entered a period of reflection 
about their and other agents’ identities and roles in the international system.  
This process in the USA attracted more attention because of the far-reaching 
impacts of its actions after the September 11 attacks. After a short period of 
vacillation between aggressively maintaining its role as the only superpower and 
securing itself by means of isolation from the threatening regions of the world, 
U.S. administration showed its determination to reinforce its role as the leader 
country in the international system by mainly using its hard power. In other 
words, an incredible amount of the vast resources of the United States have been 
committed to engaging the world and proactively protecting its own security. It 
introduced itself as the leader of free democratic world that will fight against 
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those who challenge the core principles of the civilized world. In this framework, 
Islamist fanaticism gained a prominent role as “the perversion of a proud religion” 
with its main characteristics like “intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and 
repression.”173 
Although they have not attracted the same level of attention in the literature that 
their American partners did, Europeans have entered a much more profound 
period of reflection about their identities and the place of the EU in the 
international system. It has become common to emphasize the negative impacts of 
being an economic giant and remaining a political dwarf. The desire for making 
the Union a global player is mentioned by Europeans more frequently and more 
emphasis is put in the EU’s international achievements in this respect.174 Failure 
to take any initiative in the Middle East for securing its interests that were ignored 
by Washington showed the importance of ability to act together in foreign policy 
issues. 
Whether it is right or wrong, the perceptions of the Europeans and Americans 
about the Muslim world have had considerable influences in the shaping their 
actions and the East-West relations, in general. This caused transatlantic partners 
to prioritise efforts to promote democracy and liberal values in the world, 
especially in the regions with Muslim populations. It is not an exaggeration to 
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argue that democracy promotion has become one of the core tenets of their 
security strategy. The EU has used enlargement processes, its Neighbourhood 
Policy and aids, while the USA has attached importance to the Greater Middle 
East Project, in this respect. Moreover, they prepared plans to stabilise regions 
like the Middle East by integrating them into the global economic system.175 
Transatlantic partners have also determined supporting moderate actors in the 
Islamic world against radical groups as a crucial part of their strategy in the new 
environment. They have increased their efforts to find successful examples or 
models, which are moderate and liberal Muslims in this world that can provide a 
better alternative for Muslims than armed struggle or terror. Preventing a possible 
clash of civilizations in any sense has become one of the top issues in their 
agenda.  
Last but not the least, this situation creates another point that transatlantic allies 
strongly agree on: the importance of Turkey as an asset in their strategy in the 
post-9/11 world. For them, a stable and prosperous Turkey became a desirable 
target to reach in order to cope with new threats and to secure their interests in 
regions where Turkey is politically, economically, culturally and historically 
involved to. 
Keeping this systemic structure in mind, the next chapter assesses the position of 
JDP-led Turkey in the wider international picture in the post-9/11 world. Several 
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questions related to this picture are discussed: Does Turkey share the same world 
perception with its western peers? If it does, how does this influence its foreign 
policy strategies? Can systemic factors play a decisive role in understanding and 
explaining this foreign policy? 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST 
 
 
After the election victory of Justice and Development Party that is widely known 
as an Islamist party, domestic and foreign comments were a mixture of caution 
and surprise. According to some writers, 3 November 2002 was the beginning of a 
new era not only for Turkey but also for foreigners within which they need to get 
used to talk about Turkey with a moderate Islamist government under the 
leadership of a banned winner, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.176 For many observers, the 
victory of the party and its leader was mysterious and time was necessary to reach 
a conclusion about the situation.177 However, some of them were pessimist about 
the result and already concluded that the Turkish “voters delivered the ‘wrong’ 
result.”178 
In this environment, the first action of the newly elected government was to 
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analyse the domestic and international environment and to assure everybody that 
they do not have an Islamic agenda. Rather, it announced the EU membership as 
its top priority and promised to continue and reinforce the reform process in the 
country without damaging Turkey’s previous commitments.179 In order to realise 
its plans, it took necessary steps to improve relations with Europeans and 
Americans without delay. The next day after the elections, Erdoğan announced his 
plan to tour European capitals to make a fresh start about Turkey-EU relations and 
to “reassure nervous western allies.”180  
Contrary to positive developments in JDP perception in the eyes of westerners, 
there is a growing discontent about the attitude of Kemalist establishment. There 
have been some critical voices about Kemalism in the West. Even some 
Europeans argued that Kemalism, as “the underlying philosophy of the Turkish 
state… implies an exaggerated fear of the undermining of integrity of the Turkish 
state... together with statism, an important role for army, and a very rigid attitude 
to religion, which means that this underlying philosophy itself a barrier to EU 
membership.”181 Although these kinds of arguments have not found considerable 
support until very recently, questions about this Kemalist establishment’s real 
concerns arose through the period that brought the 22 July, 2007 elections and 
                                               
179
   Judy Dempsey, “Victorious party leader prepares for whirlwind tour of Europe’s 
capitals,” Financial Times, November 6, 2002; Owen Bowcott, “Turkey’s Islamic party makes EU 
entry top priority,” The Guardian, November 4, 2002. 
180
  Owen Bowcott, “Turkey’s Islamic leader moves to reassure west,” The Guardian, 
November 5, 2002. 
181
 European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security 
and Defence Policy, Draft Report on Turkey's Application for Membership of the EU, March 12, 
2003, www.cdca.asso.fr/cdca/rapport-oostlander/rapport_oostlander_anglais.pdf. 
68 
 
afterwards. Turkish secular establishment’s acceptance of undemocratic means, 
including military intervention, in order to reach their aim, namely elimination of 
JDP, caused domestic and foreign observers to re-evaluate their perceptions about 
the social and political power centres and their relationships in Turkey. 182  
The cases in front of the Constitutional Court on sensitive and hotly debated 
issues like the election process of the president or the closure of JDP in 2008 
became a milestone in re-evaluations of westerners about the social groups in 
Turkey. The involvement of judiciary on the side of the secular establishment 
with highly debatable decisions showed how dangerous the situation for the fate 
of democracy is.183 The source of confrontation between these elites and JDP has 
begun to be seen more as a clash of interests than a fight over the regime.184 
Worries increased in the western circles about the cooperation between the 
Kemalist establishment and the ultra-nationalists that are not only “Eurosceptics,” 
but also “sceptical about the whole world.”185 Some European politicians even 
believe that “it would have been impossible to start EU negotiations,” if secular 
elites “had remained in the government.”186 Thus, most Europeans have used their 
votes in favour of JDP and Erdoğan in this confrontation, “not because (he) has 
brought… real changes to Turkish foreign policy but because (he) represents 
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Turkey’s most pro-European face.”187 JDP is perceived in western circles as an 
“opportunity” for the West, and especially the EU, that should not be wasted.188  
For many observers, this dramatic change in the roles of social groups in Turkey 
and the radical changes in Turkish foreign policy under JDP government became 
sources of confusion and a great mystery. This ambiguity in understanding the 
situation forced some analysts search for some invisible reasons like a hidden 
agenda in the minds of JDP leaders. This gave rise to fruitless and inconclusive 
debates on the sincere concerns of the Party members. Even if those who claim 
that JDP is pursuing a hidden agenda are right, this does not help too much in 
analysing Turkish foreign policy in the related era. What made such 
transformation possible still needs explanation in that case. Moreover, each and 
every year, it becomes much harder to find a potential relationship between the 
performance of JDP in government and an alleged hidden agenda. A question 
posed by a deputy-chairman of JDP to those who blame them for having a secret 
plan makes more sense at this point: “Political parties come to power in order to 
achieve the goals in their program. We have been in power with a decisive 
majority in the parliament for years and have not applied any secret plan. When 
do they believe that we will apply our so-called hidden agenda? After we leave the 
government?”189 
During the reign of JDP, it can be argued that Ankara’s position about the main 
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international issues on the world’s agenda (namely, Iraqi War, Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute, nuclear activities of Iran, Cyprus problem and so on) has been close to 
those of most European capitals.190 In this period, Turkey and the EU started the 
long process of defining their common future, while re-evaluation became 
unavoidable for Ankara and Washington about the fate of their relations. At the 
same time, America and Europe entered a new era within which they consider the 
future of transatlantic relations. In such a world that is in a state of flux, JDP-led 
Turkey’s interaction with other international agents and the structure necessitates 
closer attention. 
The rest of this chapter analyses JDP-led Turkey’s relations with main western 
agents in the post-9/11 international structure, i.e. the United States and the 
European Union. As seen in the examples below, both positive and negative 
influences of the changing ideational and perceptional factors can be observed on 
these interactions. Turkey’s foreign policy actions in neighbouring regions, 
transformation of Turkey’s identity and interest perceptions, and Ankara’s 
relations with Washington are assessed in the coming pages. Finally, Turkey’s EU 
membership vacation in the related era is analysed in detail with special emphasis 
on the negative impacts of rising non-material factors, like Islamophobia. 
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4.1 The United States, Neighbouring Regions and JDP 
International environment in the post-September 11 era is important in 
understanding JDP’s evolution. In specific terms, it can be argued that one of the 
main variables that have had impacts on JDP’s identity is its relations with the 
outside world, mainly with United States. The nature of the relationship between 
Ankara and Washington is so comprehensive that it seems impossible to analyse 
Turkey’s relations with the neighbouring regions separately. JDP has not only 
affected these relations as the governing party, but also has been affected by the 
developments in these relations. For instance, the initial confusion about JDP’s 
stance towards USA seems to be a result of this fact. In other words, although, in 
the early days, it had been seen as a pro-American party that could have been the 
Trojan horse of USA, JDP was applauded by a considerable part of the 
international community for its resistance against U.S. policies in Iraq.  
The relations between Washington and JDP’s headquarters started in a warm 
environment with Erdoğan’s Washington visit in which he was welcomed as if he 
was a prime minister. However, the famous decision, which was taken on 1 March 
2003 not to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish lands in a military action against 
Iraq, was an important signal for the beginning of a new era in Turkey-U.S. 
relations. The interesting fact in this case was that the JDP perceptions of 
international community, domestic actors and even the members of the party were 
almost completely different before and after the decision. Another fact that makes 
it harder to explain the situation was that this bill was rejected in spite of JDP’s 
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leading figures’ support. Yet, there is a clear fact that this decision and the war in 
Iraq created “a serious crisis of confidence on both sides and eventually put... the 
alliance under scrutiny.”191 In the early days of the crisis, this was a clear 
challenge to “the classic image of Turkey” that “has long been misleading” in 
Graham Fuller words: “an unshakeable friend of the United States.”192 For some 
authors, 1 March 2003 was the date when Cold War and its security mentality 
really ended for Turkey.193 
This event caused anger among the academic and media circles in USA. 
Although, the administration has not made official statements that can break the 
links that have already been damaged, pundits did not hesitate from using a harsh 
language about JDP administration. Especially in newspapers that are known for 
their close relationship with the Bush administration, like The Washington Post, 
analyses appeared to be influenced badly by the 1 March disappointment. For 
instance, in its editorial, The Washington Post argued that CHP and MHP are 
“less vehemently anti-American” than JDP and warned the Turkish voters about a 
possible JDP victory and claimed that the results in 2007 elections would 
“determine whether Turkey remains a friend of the West, or slips deeper into a 
hostile Islamist Middle East.”194 Harsher articles appeared in this newspaper, like 
the one by Frank Gaffney, where he argues that Erdoğan is “systematically 
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turning his country from a Muslim secular democracy into an Islamofascist state 
governed by an ideology anathema to European values and freedoms.”195 
The most important aspect of this development is that JDP and its grassroots have 
been seen among the decisive factors that produced the opposition to this war 
waged against another Muslim country.196 Washington’s suspicion about JDP and 
its stance towards U.S. worsened after its hard opposition against Israeli policies 
on Palestine under Ariel Sharon government. Erdoğan’s criticism was so sharp 
that he labelled Israel as a ‘terrorist state’ in a meeting with an Israeli minister. 
Some observers interpreted these harsh words towards Israel as a signal of a new 
Turkey that is “slowly and gradually distancing itself from the West.”197 This was, 
in Israeli minister’s words, another “amazing” development that confused the 
minds of outsiders about JDP’s identity and policies. This confusion was reflected 
well by Al Jazeera’s news on Erdoğan’s criticism with its stress on reminding one 
fact at the same time: “Erdoğan’s Turkey is an Israeli ally.”198 
The terrorist attacks in Istanbul in late 2003 opened a new phase in the war 
against terror and changed the psychological environment in Turkey-U.S. 
relations. Although the attacks seemed to target two synagogues, a London-based 
international bank and the British consulate building, they happened in the biggest 
city of Turkey and casualties were mostly from Muslim Turks. Observers 
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perceived the attacks as Turkey’s 9/11, and argued that they “open a new border 
in the terror war.”199 Bombings seem to have strengthened the position of Turkey 
and JDP in the western eyes as an important ally in any effort that aims to stop 
terror and clash between civilizations. As a senior French antiterrorism official 
puts, Turkey became the target of terrorists who “don’t want people to be able to 
say, ‘See, democracy and freedom can thrive in a Muslim country’.”200 
Another development that brought excitement to Ankara-Washington-Jerusalem 
relations was Khaled Meshaal’s Ankara visit, which took place interestingly in 
JDP’s headquarters instead of any other state building. Both U.S. and Israel 
criticized the visit. However, JDP told the visit was “the result of normal relations 
between the two parties, the [JDP] and Hamas,” instead of an official invitation 
and emphasized their aim as putting forward international demands that the 
resistance group renounce violence, recognize Israel and honour the previous 
agreements between Israel and the Palestinian authority.201 
In his book entitled Strategic Depth, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Tayyip Erdoğan’s chief 
policy advisor, argues that the traditional pro-Western orientation of Turkey’s 
foreign policy had resulted in its neglecting ties with its neighbours, especially in 
the Middle East.202 All developments mentioned above are seen as a result of the 
background and identity of JDP that wants Turkey to have close relations with 
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neighbouring Muslim countries, instead of being a loyal ally of U.S. in the region 
as it has been for decades. Contrary to expectations, this did not seem to have 
decreased Turkey’s importance in strategic calculations of U.S. in the region. For 
instance, even after Ankara rejected U.S. request to use Turkey as a base in the 
war against Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Colin Powell, named Turkey 
as “a Muslim democracy” living in peace with its friends and neighbours that 
post-war Iraq should take as a model.203  
Even more interestingly, Turkey’s relations with Israel have recovered so rapidly 
during the JDP government that Pinhas Avivi, Israel’s ambassador to Turkey, says 
that Israel is “at the highest moment in relations with Turkey ever... that no 
prophet could have seen... in advance.”204 
 
4.2 The European Union and JDP 
 “Is Turkey seeking a marriage of convenience or of love with the EU?”  
Berlusconi, Italian Prime Minister 
 
“A Catholic marriage – one that lasts forever.” 
Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister205 
 
Inter-state relations are generally accepted to be emotion-free. As a continuation 
to this understanding Turkey-EU relations may be seen as a combination of 
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rational calculations between two serious international actors. This can be true, if 
those who interact with each other are really the states themselves. However, 
states do not and cannot act or interact. Rather, human beings do these kinds of 
things in the name of states. Thus, common assumptions about international 
relations may turn out to be wrong in real-life situations. Emotions, perceptions, 
ideas play important roles in the international relations. Only within this 
framework, the question of Sylvio Berlusconi, Italian prime minister, and the 
answer of his Turkish counterpart can be understood.  
The international relations may not be this much personal in general. However, 
this does not decrease the importance of non-material factors in shaping 
interactions between agents and the system and among the agents themselves. The 
meanings behind the concepts or words that we use may define the policies of 
international actors. For instance, “Turkey’s EU membership” may seem to 
represent a regular membership relation. However, it is much more than that. For 
some, it means the end of Europe. For some, it is a crucial step in the fight against 
terror. The perceptions related to these three words differ within a wide range 
from ‘catastrophe’ to ‘victory.’ Thus, it can be argued that how actors perceive 
Turkey in the international system defines their behaviours in issues related to 
Turkey. 
Turkey’s prospective EU membership has always attracted attention in the 
academic and political circles. This attraction has been reinforced by Huntington’s 
famous argument that Turkey is “historically the most obvious and protypical torn 
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country” that “rejected Mecca” and that is “rejected by Brussels.”206 He is 
confident that Turkey “will not become a member” of the Christian EU because of 
its Muslim identity.  
The attention of the world became so high about the membership of Turkey to the 
EU that it almost became part of the “daily press coverage” in the West and 
“discussion in top business and political reaches of the Muslim world.”207 Thus, 
the issue could not escape from the influences of changing ideational and 
perceptional climate of post-9/11 world. It became commonplace to argue that if 
EU rejects “the world’s most democratic and secular Muslim country, it cannot be 
serious about bridging the gap between Islam and Christianity.”208 As a result, 
Turkey’s EU membership issue gained an “iconic status.”209 Keeping the 
achievements during the process that led to the start of negotiation in mind, it is 
argued that Turkey’s membership means a lot in terms of “peace, prosperity and 
democracy” in its region.210 
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4.2.1 Historical Background 
“Turkey is part of Europe.”211 
Walter Hallstein, 1963 
 European Commission President 
 
In historical analyses, it is generally accepted that Ottoman Empire became a part 
of “European community of states” after the Crimean War in 1856.212 The 
reforms introduced in the Empire towards the end of its history have been seen as 
westernisation efforts to close the gap between itself and other western powers. 
Although the independence war has been fought against western states, the 
establishment of Turkish Republic increased the velocity of this rapprochement. 
Turkey’s relationship with the West gained more importance during the Cold 
War because of the common Soviet threat. During this period, Turkey actively 
took part in all major western institutions, except the European Union. In addition 
to early memberships in the Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952); it 
became founding member of OECD (1961) and OSCE (1973). On the other hand, 
from 1959 on Turkey-EU relations gained positive slope in spite of fluctuations. 
Its relations with Europe have always had an important place in Turkey’s history. 
However, especially in the last decade, the European Union has been the most 
prominent external factor that has had the most considerable impact on the factors 
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that shaped Turkey’s identity. Keeping the ‘westernization’ as one of the main 
pillars of Turkish foreign policy in mind, it can be argued that the relations with 
the EU and the reform (or transformation) process pushed by the EU membership 
perspective became the main impulse behind the change in Turkey within the last 
years that led to a kind of silent revolution.213 For this reason, when it is asked to 
Turkish politicians and analysts about the reasons for Turkish willingness to enter 
European Union, most of the time the answers start with a political one: to 
achieve an aim that was showed by the founding father of the republic and to 
reach to the level of civilised nations. 
Much longer before the (post-) Communist countries could have imagined being 
a member of the European Union, and even before Spanish or Austrians were 
thinking about it, Turkey made its application for becoming part of European 
Economic Community in 1959. The relationship gained a different status with the 
signature of an association agreement, namely Ankara Agreement, between the 
parties in 1963. The agreement foresaw three phases that would lead to a customs 
union. However, the ultimate aim was the full membership of Turkey. Jose 
Torreblanca draws attention to the interesting fact that French president De 
Gaulle rejected British application at a time when he accepted to open the way for 
Turkey to a possible membership with the signature of Ankara Agreement. His 
arguments against UK membership were not more than what today’s analysts are 
familiar with: UK “is not fully European, but Atlantic” and moreover, it “is the 
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USA’s Trojan Horse.”214 
The relationship has experienced fluctuations due to developments both in 
Turkey and Europe. 1987 signalled the beginning of a new era in the relations 
with the application of Turkey for full membership. The application was rejected 
at that time, however it was emphasised by the Union that Turkey is fully eligible 
for such application. Although the customs union established in 1996 was a 
considerably positive step, the problems in the relations reached to its peak after 
1997 Luxembourg Summit that left Turkey behind the post-Communist countries 
in the accession process. The crisis was partly solved in 1999 Helsinki Summit 
where Turkey gained official candidate status.  The coalition government at that 
time introduced several reforms in Turkey for meeting the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria. However, the real momentum came with the election of JDP single-party 
government in 2002. 
 
4.2.2 Domestic Background 
It is obvious that a radical transformation has occurred in the attitude of political 
Islam in Turkey regarding EU affairs. The JDP is perceived to represent an 
important step in this transformation with its pro-European stand.  JDP leaders 
named their party’s ideology as “conservative democracy” in order to show their 
difference from the previous Islamist movement (i.e. National View Movement) 
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which most of them had belonged to. However, it is not wrong to argue that many 
leading figures of the party have a “pro-Islamic background.”215 They served in 
the parliament in parties like National Salvation Party (NSP), Welfare Party (WP) 
and Virtue Party (VP). This necessitates analysing the evolution of their 
perception of Europe without ignoring the National View tradition. 
National View Movement had traditionally based its position on persistent 
opposition to the West. This caused it to be against Turkey’s warm relations with 
the EU and thus its candidacy process. This opposition was so sharp that “a 
common market between Turkey and western states” was believed to “result in 
Turkey’s colonization and to make Turks labourers of the West.”216 
National View Movement maintained its anti-globalization and anti-Western 
attitude until the late 1990s. However, it is well known that the so-called 28 
February process became a turning point in the evolution of this movement in 
many ways. It also stimulated the radical change in their approach towards the 
West, especially the EU. The VP, which was established after the closure of WP 
in 1998, became one of the keenest parties on Turkish membership of the EU. It 
expected that the membership would guarantee freedoms while diminishing the 
role of the military in political arena.217 Abdullah Gül, then senior VP deputy, 
after mentioning that “in the past, [WP] was reluctant to join the European 
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Union,” reflected the policy shift of his party by saying, “We now want to become 
a full member. We realize that without integration into Europe, democratic 
standards of human rights cannot be achieved in this country.”218 
Ziya Öniş points out that “radical differences could be detected” in the political 
programs of WF and VP.219 VP, itself, paid attention on emphasizing its 
difference from WP. Recai Kutan, the leader of VP, told in a television interview 
that his party, contrary to WP, strictly supported the promotion of democracy, 
human rights, and political freedoms. He also stressed that the leaders of the VP 
“had learned from their experience in the last couple of years that democracy 
comes first - without it, nothing else can be accomplished.”220 However, this did 
not prevent the Constitutional Court from closing the party for becoming a center 
of anti-secularist actions. It is interesting to note that the Court rejected attorney 
general’s allegation that VP is the continuation of a closed party, namely WP.221 
With the closure of VP, the tension between ‘old guards’ and new ‘reformists’ 
within the party reached to its peak and this gave birth to two new parties: Felicity 
Party (FP) under the legal leadership of Kutan and informal leadership of 
Erbakan, and JDP under Erdoğan’s leadership. There is a great debate on the 
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sincerity of the change in JDP leaders’ views and the reasons for their departure 
from the National View Movement. Although there are various approaches on this 
issue, it seems more useful to pay attention to the views of current members of the 
Movement. For instance, Şevket Kazan, one of the leading and famous figures of 
National View Movement, argues that there was no trust between ‘traditionalists’ 
and ‘reformists’ even before the closure of VP.222  
Lütfü Esengül, a leading FP member, argues that the roots of the opposition of the 
group that established JDP goes back to the congress of National Salvation Party 
(NSP) in 1978, in which Korkut Özal opposed the traditional leaders of the 
movement. He believes that Özal is the mentor of them. He also argues that this 
group tried to transform the VP into a party like Motherland Party (MP) or current 
JDP before leaving the movement.223 However, the change in JDP leaders’ 
attitudes was so radical that it was not only outsiders but also themselves who was 
surprised about that change. For instance, Abdullah Gül, the former second man 
of JDP, says that when he watched the video cassettes on Erdoğan’s previous 
speeches with him, they were both astonished and Erdoğan was amazed about his 
own speeches.224 
Whatever their sincere beliefs are, almost all observers agree on the fact that JDP 
politicians have given importance to western values of democracy, human rights 
and rule of law in their core-periphery analysis, and have perceived them as 
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guarantees for moving their base to the center while establishing legitimacy 
against secularist Kemalist core. This opened the way for reinforced reform 
process under JDP government that resulted in the opening of the negotiations 
with European Union. Democratisation reforms were so successful that the 
European Commission declared that “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the [Copenhagen] 
political criteria.”225 In other words, Turkey was accepted by the West, itself, as a 
country that achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities by the year 2004, 
under a so-called pro-Islamist government. As has been mentioned before, 
although criticisms arose about the slowing pace of reforms in the coming years, 
the initial opinion has been reinforced with the repeated emphasis in various 
declarations and documents on the fact that “Turkey continues to sufficiently 
fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria” during the negotiation process.226 JDP’s 
economic agenda and performance has also been welcomed by the West. This has 
been reflected in the opinions of both private and public actors that openly 
appreciate what has been done in Turkish economy by the government after 2002 
elections.  
Ironically at the same time, “the old line Kemalists, who for 80 years preached 
about the need to modernize and Westernize Turkey, have in many ways become 
                                               
225
  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament -Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession (Brussels, 06/10/2004), 3. 
226
  For instance see, Olli Rehn, “Answer given by Mr. Rehn on behalf of the Commission;” 
European Commission, “Key findings of the progress reports on the candidate countries,” 3. 
85 
 
the reactionaries in Turkey.”227 The resistance of the old westernisers (i.e. civil 
and military elites) against the reform efforts seem to have turned them into new 
conservatives, in the real meaning of the term, while the so-called Islamists have 
become new modernisers and westernisers of the country. This Kemalist elite is 
believed by most observers to continue dominating not only military, but also the 
civilian bureaucracy, judiciary, and media. The so-called “deep state” in Turkey is 
argued to resist many of the changes introduced by the JDP.228 
This group claims that they are the genuine guardians of Atatürk’s principles and 
the “real inheritors of the Kemalist legacy.” However, they are criticised for 
hiding their real concerns: “protecting their current statuses.”229 Their main 
argument about the threat against the foundation stones of the regime is called by 
many domestic and foreign observers as “fact-free paranoia.”230 Rather, some 
analysts believe that the real threat for Turkey is “secular fundamentalism” that 
increasingly turned into an “anti-western, anti-religious and anti-liberal” 
ideology.231 
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4.2.3 International Background 
Post-9/11 environment have had both positive and negative impacts on Turkey’s 
EU vacation. Although it have had considerably favourable influences on policy 
makers to view Turkey as an asset in the changing international environment, it 
dropped the support for Turkey’s membership by creating a negative image of 
Islam in the eyes of European public. Thus, a potential flow of Turkish migrants 
became more than a problem of labour competition in the eyes of some 
Europeans with the rise of Islamophobia. Although pundits believe that “any 
moderately-well informed citizen in Europe know that immigrant Turks have not 
been responsible for acts of violence... and Turkey has the most secularized and 
democratic polity of any country of Muslim culture,” this issue is exploited by 
“some populist newspapers and politicians in Europe.”232  
The support for Turkey’s membership came from a large group of foreign actors 
that included some interesting allies, like its traditional rival Greece. Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdoğan is seen in the West as the most pro-European leader. 
However, for Greece, he has a special place as the only Turkish leader who 
challenged traditional Turkish position in terms of problems between two 
countries, especially the Cyprus issue.233 However, the real change in Greek 
position came after a shift of perceptions about its interests. By means of 
ideational change, Turkey’s traditional ‘enemy’ became one of the anxious 
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supporters of Turkish membership. Although, all other material factors remain in 
place, the official Greek interest perception became based on the belief that a 
European Turkey is much less dangerous for Greece. This simple but important 
change in perception dramatically changed the Greek position in terms of Turkish 
EU membership in public, political and economic circles. Transformed 
perception openly foresees a potential membership as a win-win situation. This 
was well reflected in the words of former Greek Defence Minister Yannos 
Papantoniou, who argued that Greeks “simply believe that if and when [Turkey] 
joins the European Union it will be obliged to observe these rules and values. 
This will by itself resolve most of our problems.”234 The change is so dramatic 
that Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyanni, claimed that “supporting 
Turkey’s accession is a choice of strategic character” for Greece.235  
Turkish membership found support from different segments of European 
leadership as well. For instance, in her visit to Turkey Queen Elizabeth argued 
that “Turkey is uniquely positioned as a bridge between East and West at a 
crucial time for the European Union and the world in general.” She continued in 
reference to the Alliance of Civilizations initiative that Turkey can play “a key 
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role in promoting peace, political stability and economic development in some of 
the world’s most unsettled areas.”236 
Another astonishing support came from the Pope Benedict XVI in his historic 
visit in Turkey in late 2006. Contrary to all expectations, he declared that he 
would like to see Turkey become a member of the EU.237 This change of mind is 
seen by some analysts as remarkable, in view of his supposed infallibility.238 
 
4.2.4 Negotiation process starts, but... 
After a positive Commission report on Turkey, EP Foreign Affairs Committee 
declared that the negotiations should start. However, like other bodies, they felt 
the necessity to strongly re-emphasise the open-endedness of the process in 
various places of their decision.239 The expectation was a smooth beginning for a 
long and tiring journey. However, in spite of all formal promises given 
unanimously by all member states and official documents declaring positive 
results about opening the negotiation talks, the ceremony about opening 
negotiation process was thrown into crisis and turmoil by Austria’s last minute 
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“hostility” towards Turkish membership.240 José Manuel Barroso declared in the 
opening ceremony that he can “guarantee, on behalf of the European Union, that 
Turkey will be treated in the same way as all other candidates.”241 But, this 
promise became questionable from the very first day. 
The difficulties experienced in taking the decision to open negotiation process 
gave strong signals about the nature of the issue. The insistence of France on a 
future referendum and the demand of Austria to open talks with Croatia in return 
of dropping its opposition to Turkish membership talks showed that some 
member states have some other plans in their minds. More interestingly pundits 
did not hesitate to refer to Austria’s battles against Ottoman Empire and its strong 
Roman Catholic roots to explain its opposition.242 
Moreover, the negotiation framework disappointed many Turks with its emphasis 
on open-endedness, absorption capacity, potential long transitional periods, 
derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses.243 Slovenian 
Prime Minister Janez Jansa explained the logic behind this emphasis on open-
endedness with the aim of preventing everybody from having “the illusion that 
everything will go smoothly.”244 
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The Commission has been favouring the continuation of negotiations without 
artificial interference from member states. Commission officials, like the 
president Jose Manuel Barroso, repeatedly reminded the fact that the process is 
handled by them “on the basis of a mandate handed down unanimously by the 
member states.” 245 However, later developments proved that those who expect a 
highly problematic process were right. Although, as has been clearly mentioned 
by the former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, in his 
speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, “the fact that Turkey belongs to 
Europe was recognised already in [the] Association Agreement of 1963,” 
Turkey’s Europeanness became questionable for many Europeans after the 
opening of the negotiations.246 
Following intellectual problems, real obstacles arose in the process. In December 
2006, the European Council decided to provisionally suspend eight chapters from 
the accession negotiations with Turkey as a reaction to Turkey’s refusal to apply 
the additional protocol to the agreement on the EU-Turkey Customs Union to 
Cyprus, which was supposed to expand the agreement to cover all the new 
Member States that acceded to the Union on 1 May 2004. However, Turkish 
government insists that the Union should first keep its promises given to Turkish 
Cypriots in 2004 after the rejection of Annan Plan by the no votes of Greek 
Cypriots. The EU seems to be unable to keep that promise because of the veto of 
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Cyprus as a member state. This issue turns out to be a deadlock for the time 
being. Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik emphasizes that decision to 
suspend chapters is “a clear break in the negotiations.” According to her, “"tailor-
made partnership, say in the form of a European-Turkish Community” is more 
realistic option than full membership.247 
During German presidency, France pushed hard to block opening one of the three 
negotiation chapters that were ready to be opened. That chapter was the key area 
of economic and monetary policy. The only reason for Sarkozy to lobby hard to 
prevent opening that negotiation chapter was the political, economic and 
symbolic importance of the chapter by giving a full membership perspective. In 
the words of a German official, not opening that chapter “was a political decision 
emanating from Paris.” Turkish side reacted to this decision by claiming that, for 
the first time ever, a negotiation chapter is not opened “on the grounds that it 
would bring Turkey closer to full membership.” 248  More important point is the 
fact that it does not seem to be the last time. 
Most of the difficulties came with the transformation of official mentality after 
the changes in governments of some member states, especially France. It is not a 
secret for anybody that French President Nicolas Sarkozy is firmly opposed to 
Turkish membership. He based his arguments on geographical and cultural 
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elements by claiming that the EU is not only an idea but also a geographical 
entity. Although he seemed to accept the fact that the EU should keep its promise 
to continue negotiations, his strongest comment on Turkey came in 2007 when he 
claimed that “Turkey has no place inside the European Union.” Although he does 
not show any reason for that argument, he claims that accepting Turkey will 
mean “enlarging Europe with no limit” and can lead to risk “destroying European 
political union.”249 
During the process, France used every chance to block negotiations. Even though 
it was symbolic, it was seen as a victory of France when French officials 
prevented their European colleagues from using the words “accession” or 
“membership” in a foreign ministers’ statement on EU enlargement strategy 
concerning Turkey. Volkan Bozkır, Turkish ambassador to the EU, reflected the 
situation in Ankara by saying “we are heartbroken and tired of waiting.” He also 
warned the European politicians that EU is losing its influence on Turkish people 
by such acts. In his words, in a very short period of time “the EU has lost its 
leverage on Turkey. It has used up all its ammunition except for stopping the 
negotiations totally.”250 In reaction to Turkish complaints about French 
discontent with the word ‘accession,’ Olli Rehn advised the Turkish government 
to “focus on reforms instead of words.”251 
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Other blow came when France accepted to hold referendum for new 
enlargements. The initial aim was to hold referendum only for Turkey by 
mentioning only those countries with populations over 5% of the Union’s entire 
size. As clearly mentioned by Andrew Duff, vice-chairman of the EU-Turkey 
Joint Parliamentary Committee, this French law is “an unfortunate example of 
French xenophobia towards Turkey.” His proposal for solving this problem is to 
transform France into “a more mature parliamentary democracy” instead of “a 
place where populism and plebiscites rule.”252 
Spanish scholar Jose Torreblanca criticises French and Austrian politicians for 
their populist decision to hold referendum about Turkey’s membership by boldly 
asking them to “imagine” what could have been the result “if Spain’s 
membership in the European Union had been subjected to referendum in 
1981.”253 This situation also clearly undermines the credibility of decisions taken 
by the Council in all other areas. Because it shows that elected governments’ 
unanimous decisions are not really legitimate and enough and should be subject 
to public vote, especially on important topics. However, this is not the case. This 
kind of approach was not applied for any crucial decision, including all previous 
enlargement decisions or treaties. This causes questions to arise whether Turkish 
membership issue is more important than all actions taken by the Union to date, 
including the constitution making process of the Union or all other enlargements 
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with 21 more member states from original 6 members of the Union. 
The European Commission tried to answer the questions in the minds of 
Europeans after the big enlargement wave in 2004 by publishing a paper named 
Myths and Facts about Enlargement.254 In that document the Commission argues 
that the enlargement was done in a democratic way because of the consent of all 
member governments in the Summit. However, it is a serious question how this 
explanation can be legitimised while some member states insist on the necessity 
to take Turkish issue to public vote. 
Turkey is pretty reactive against the behaviour of the European politicians at this 
point of the process. This was reflected well when the French initiative to 
establish a Mediterranean Union was not seen in Ankara as a sound plan. Rather, 
after the general image that “Sarkozy indicated that joining such a club may be a 
better course for Turkey to follow than joining the EU,” it has been perceived as a 
trap. It became possible for Turkey to participate in the project only after the 
assurances from other member states and the Commission about the plan that it is 
“not directed against Turkey, nor is it aimed at diverting the focus away from 
Turkey’s EU accession talks.”255 
This physiological situation is also reflected in declarations of Turkish leaders. 
As a reaction to special partnership offers, Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish prime 
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minister, claimed that no country, except Turkey, “has ever been offered a 
conditional or a special membership, or a conditional or special negotiation 
period.” These types of behaviours, he continued, are perceived by Turkey as 
“ugly” ones.256 
Turks are assured by officials from the highest levels that “there will be no new 
conditions.”257 What Turkey expects from EU members is to respect the basic 
principle of international law, as has been done by Angela Merkel who is against 
Turkish membership: pacta sunt servanda. As mentioned by a Swedish diplomat, 
“anyone who ignores this principle with regard to Turkey loses political 
credibility and flouts official EU policy.” 258 Turkey also draws attention to the 
fact that although it is argued that the Union’s absorption capacity has always 
been relevant, the report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members came 
only in 2006.259 
Turkish side consistently emphasises the importance of keeping the goal of full 
membership firmly in place is essential to “keep the reform process alive.” Thus, 
it criticises the EU for slowing down the negotiations. In a press conference, 
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan asked why the technical reports on 11 of the 35 
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negotiating chapter were not completed by the Commission. 260 
Another criticism from Turkey is the double-standard applied by the Union in 
terms of membership criteria. The argument follows that the Union actors and 
public is closely monitoring the developments and the reforms process in Turkey. 
The conditionality principle is strictly applied in Turkish case. However, the EU 
is criticised for not showing the same sensitivity and not really caring about the 
fulfilment of the membership criteria in the last enlargement wave. It is believed 
that the Union accepted those countries with political decisions. The decisions to 
close the negotiation chapter often seemed to be arbitrary.261 The latest 
developments in Bulgaria proved that these arguments are not baseless. Although 
high attention is paid on criticising Turkey and problems about implementations, 
the real crisis came in 2008 from Bulgaria, a member state, which was punished 
for wasting the Union funds with corruption. Commission spokesman, Johannes 
Laitenberger, did not hesitate from saying that “the fight against high-level 
corruption and organised crime is not producing enough results” in Bulgaria. 
Commission Report on Bulgaria confessed that “institutions and procedures look 
good on paper but do not produce good results in practice.”262 
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4.2.5 What Makes Turkey’s Negotiations Different and Harder? 
Turkey’s EU membership negotiation process has attracted unprecedented level of 
attention all around the world. Even those who are not really interested in EU 
related issues are keen to talk about Turkey-EU relations. Because of the 
popularity of the issue, it became almost impossible to escape from emotional and 
ideational perspectives. This negotiation process is no more an issue that is dealt 
only by European and Turkish bureaucrats. Rather, it is something that even 
ordinary citizens are used to hear or read on the news. 
Turkey’s negotiation process is different and more problematic than the previous 
ones. It took less than one year after the start of the negotiations for the 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn to warn the parties about a potential “train 
crash.”263 Contrary to the formal discourse, the process is much more than a 
technical procedure. Although, post-9/11 social environment provided some 
arguments for supporting Turkey’s EU membership in strategic calculations, it 
created considerable obstacles at the same time by being source of the fear and 
confusion in the minds and hearts of Europeans. This has been reflected well in 
the fact that “the more Europeans have began to see Islam as an existential threat 
in post-September 11 era, the more they tend to define Turkey as one of the 
potential ‘others’ of the EU’s emerging identity.”264 
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As European Commissioner Olli Rehn rightly points out “every time the EU 
accepts new members, it changes.”265 However, Turkish membership, contrary to 
other ones, seems to force Europeans to transform their perceptions about 
themselves. Many things that have been taken for granted are questioned. 
Europeans seem to start understanding what “united in diversity” really can mean. 
In the words of David Phillips, Turkey’s membership will not only change Turkey 
but also “transform what it means to be European.” 266 As Jose Torreblanca puts it, 
the process showed that “to be European in Turkey is quite different from being 
European in Paris, Stockholm or Dublin.” But this is the case, he continues, for 
every member country. It is not only Turkey, which is different.267  
The reasons behind the difficulties in the negotiation process are mainly based on 
perceptions and ideas. Non-material factors play a considerable role even in those 
cases that might be seen as material factors such as geographical location or 
Turkey’s big population. The debates on the borders of the Union or the 
perceptions about the labour force requirements of Europe in the future show the 
importance of constructivist perspective in understanding such issues. 
Although the opposition in Turkey towards EU membership is a factor in 
determining the pace of negotiations, it is not what makes Turkish membership 
different than others. Because, the character of that opposition is not too much 
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different than what can be observed in other candidate countries. On the other 
hand, the real challenge comes from the opposition in the EU against Turkish 
membership, which is unprecedented in the enlargement history. 
The reasons behind the difficulties in the negotiation process are mostly based on 
perceptions and ideas shaped within the new international structure after 
September 11. Non-material factors play a considerable role even in those cases 
that might be seen as material factors such as geographical location or big 
population. The debates on the borders of the Union or the perceptions about the 
labour force need of Europe in the future show the importance of constructivist 
lenses in understanding these kinds of debates. As mentioned by Antonio 
Missiroli, “it is extremely difficult to base the debate [about Turkey] on an 
objective assessment” because of the fact that “where one stands depends on what 
one sees” in this case. Turkey’s characteristics like its population, size, and 
geographical location are perceived as “strategic assets” by some, while they are 
seen as “structural liabilities” by others. 268  
There are various arguments used by those who oppose a potential Turkish 
membership. Its geographical location, religion, culture, large and agricultural 
population come among the most popular ones. However, the tension in the 
debates dramatically increased when the opposition about Turkey’s EU 
membership became based on arguments with identity and civilizational basis. It 
                                               
268
  Antonio Missiroli, “Foreword,” in Amanda Akçakoca, “EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: 
train crash or temporary derailment?” EPC Issue Paper, no.50 (November 2006). 
100 
 
is generally argued that economy or any other objective material criteria will not 
be the real concern in deciding about Turkey’s full membership. This argument is 
supported with the relative success of Turkey about these criteria. Very few 
Europeans can deny the fact that Turkey’s situation, in objective material terms, is 
similar to the two newcomers in the Union, namely Bulgaria and Romania, and at 
least as good as Spain and Portugal when they applied.269 
Thus, emotional, identity-related and civilizational arguments seem to dominate 
the opposition against Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, former French 
president Valery Giscard d’Estaing argues that “Turkey’s capital is not in Europe; 
95 per cent of its population lives outside Europe; it is not a European country.”270 
However, his real concern is the identity and Muslim population of Turkey. 
Although Turkey is officially accepted by the Union to share the European values 
that are known to everybody, some Europeans like Edmund Stoiber, the Bavarian 
prime minister, believe that “Turkey is not part of Europe’s community of 
values,”271 without mentioning what these values are. Looking at these examples, 
many commentators believe that there is at least a certain amount of hostility to 
Turkey in some EU member countries.272 
The reasons for objections have sometimes become harsh as in the example of 
Dutch European commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, who warned that Turkey’s 
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membership will mean “the Islamisation of Europe” without hesitating to claim 
that it will mean “the relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain.” 273 For 
Turkish public, nothing can be more awkward than using this argument to oppose 
Turkey’s membership to a Union that arose from the ashes of the most brutal war 
the world has ever seen. This shows a lack of understanding even at commissioner 
level about the logic behind the establishment of the Union on the basis of 
cooperation of two recent enemies, namely France and Germany. 
The role of media is crucial to mention at this point. After a general survey on the 
news related to Turkey in the European press, Ellen Svendsen concludes that the 
most important characteristics is “negativity.” By focusing only on negative 
things like bomb attacks, catastrophes, violations of human rights and ignoring all 
positive developments the news coverage create a negative image of Turkey.274 
Another important aspect of media coverage is the emphasis on Turkey as a 
Muslim country. With influences of negative image of Islam after 9/11 in the eyes 
of European citizens, this became one of the reasons of opposition to Turkish 
membership. In Svendsen’s words, “throughout European history, Turks have 
persistently been associated with violence, sexual perversion and stupidity.” 
Combined with the historical ‘otherness’ of Ottoman Empire in shaping European 
identity, it became more common to argue that Turkey is culturally different than 
other Europeans whatever the developments are. It also became commonplace to 
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hear European politicians asking for opening a debate about European Union’s 
identity when they are asked about Turkish membership. However, the same 
politicians do not refrain from giving long speeches about the success of European 
Union although they claim that they do not know what it really is. For those who 
cannot tell what Europe is, says Ellen Svendsen, Turkey plays a crucial “role of 
the convenient other that can tell us who we are.”275 
One interesting argument of those who oppose Turkish membership like 
Wolfgang Schauble, deputy head of the CDU/CSU group in German Bundestag, 
is that Europe has made a crucial mistake by “postpon[ing] for too long a 
discussion about the ultimate limits of EU extension and about the meaning of 
European identity.” 276 Although David Phillips criticises him in the same article 
for reflecting the view of Europe’s older generation, Schauble asserts that Europe 
should stop lying to Turkey and be “honest” enough to say that it will never be a 
full member.277 This perspective is well reflected by a speech of another CDU 
member in the Bundestag who claimed they are the honest ones by saying Turkey 
can only have a privileged partnership, while SDU is giving wrong hopes (or 
lying) to Turkey about full membership. 
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4.2.6 A critical look at objections 
Culture and Religion 
Swedish diplomat Ingmar Karlsson claims that if Turkey is rejected on cultural or 
religious basis, it can easily be argued that Greece should have been kept out for 
its Eastern Orthodox religion, or “semi-Orientals” like Romanians and Bulgarians 
should not have been accepted, or Albanians and Bosnians should be forced to be 
the outsiders forever. She adds that this will be a serious message to Muslims 
already residing in the Union that they are “second-class citizens.”278 
In Ludger Kühnhardt’s words, “it would constitute a blatant betrayal of trust if 
Turkey’s orientation towards Europe and European promises to Turkey were 
refused by the EU itself.” He emphasises at this point that the core of European 
credibility, namely “honesty,” should not be demolished by the EU itself.279 
The time for Europeans to discuss the Europeanness of Turkey was when Turkey 
applied for association agreement in 1959. The Union had another chance to 
discuss it in 1987. Again the Europeans said Turkey is eligible for application. 
And there is only one criterion for application: being a European country that 
respects 6(1) of TEU. The EU members declared that Turkey was eligible 
contrary to countries like Morocco that was rejected for not being a European 
country. After the formal candidacy and opening of negotiation process it is not 
                                               
278
  Ingmar Karlsson, Consul General of Sweden, “Turkey’s Cultural and Religious Heritage– 
An Asset to the European Union,” CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor, no. 10 (October 2004): 3. 
279
  Ludger Kühnhardt, “Turkey’s Capability to Become Member of the EU,” ZEI EU-
Turkey-Monitor 1, no. 1 (October 2005): 3. 
104 
 
possible for Turkish side to understand this questioning. 
For many Turks, adopting EU acquis is a serious commitment and it can be done 
only with partners, which do not keep questioning Turkey’s identity each and 
every year again and again in spite of all previous declarations. 
Absorption capacity 
Proponents of the crucial importance of the concept especially in terms of Turkish 
membership openly argue that this criterion is more than enough to prevent 
Turkey’s membership even if it fulfils all requirements.280 As has been said 
before, although it is argued that the criterion has been valid for all candidates, the 
effort to determine what absorption capacity means came only in 2006 with a 
Commission report.281 
On the other hand, some analysts believe that the debate on the absorption 
capacity of the Union is used as a tool by “those who are afraid of the effects of 
their own [acts] and curse European integration for things which in fact their own 
national governments and the leftovers of their respective sovereignty have 
caused.”282 Likewise, Vural Öger, member of the Socialist Group in the European 
Parliament, also claims that this debate is used “to formulate a new criterion to be 
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imposed to candidate countries, especially to Turkey.”283  
Although he agreed that the absorption capacity is a criterion, Olli Rehn cautioned 
that Europeans have to “avoid making enlargement hostage to a theological 
debate on the final borders of Europe” and wanted European politicians not to 
disrupt the negotiation process irresponsibly, “for the sake of Europe.”284 For 
some observers, rather than being a result of enlargement, the debate about the 
absorption capacity arose with confusion in the minds of Europeans about their 
identity and a loss of confidence after the failure of the ratification process of the 
Constitution. At this point there is a general agreement that discussions about 
further enlargement are highly influenced by a number of problems and fears, real 
or imagined, some of which have nothing to do with enlargement.285 
Privileged partnership 
This issue seems to become an obstacle because of the problems of some 
European leaders in reading the new international picture and Turkey’s 
perceptions rightly. Although such status does not exist in the Union acquis, some 
members, including Germany and France, started proposing a privileged 
partnership to Turkey. This caused serious reaction from Turkey and was totally 
rejected from the very beginning. Turkish side claims that there is an obvious fact 
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that many refrain from mentioning: not any single EU member state will accept 
giving away their membership rights and simply adopting what other EU 
members do even if they believe that what EU does is “good” for everybody. 
Forget about membership rights, it is not secret that all member states debate for 
long days or months to discuss their voting weights or a commissioner chair that 
is supposed to be non-national. The reaction of member states towards decreasing 
the number of commissioners shows how sensitive the issue is. 
There is also a misunderstanding that the customs union between Turkey and the 
EU is a good basis for establishing a privileged partnership status. However, the 
customs union is seen by Turkey as a step towards full membership. That’s why it 
accepted to apply those customs also towards third parties even though it has no 
power in the decision making mechanisms. It is impossible for Turkey to continue 
this one-sided relationship that favours the EU if it loses the full membership 
perspective.  
Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for enlargement, also warned that “the regular 
talk of privileged partnership only undermines the EU’s credibility and weakens 
the conditionality in Turkey.” He highlighted the fact that this kind of behaviours 
only reduce “the political incentive for reforms and causes political backlash 
among ordinary Turks.”286 
Scapegoating 
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European politicians seem to use opposition to Turkish membership as a tool in 
domestic politics. It seems more efficient if they try to face the problems and 
refrain from taking populist positions like offering Turkey a different status than 
membership and ensuring their voters that they were not really serious when they 
promised Turkey a clear membership perspective in various documents and 
presidency conclusions. If they do not change their positions, it is impossible for 
Turkey to “win the hearts and minds of European citizens” on its own, as it is 
asked by the Union.287 
For instance, the failures of the ratification process of the draft constitution and 
the Lisbon Treaty occurred in the Union without Turkey. Contrary to the 
expectations, it was not a big country like Turkey but a small country, Ireland, 
which stopped the second process. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the 
membership of 12 different nations with a similar total population and much 
bigger voting weights did not create a similar discussion among the Europeans 
like the one about Turkey that might become a member in at least more than a 
decade. 
Many Europeans claim that the EU will not work with a huge country like 
Turkey. However, there are already serious problems about decision making 
mechanisms of the Union. It is commonly accepted that the political and 
institutional problems are evident in the EU of 27. The Council is frequently 
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unable to take decisions due to the existing veto rights288 On the other hand; there 
are scientific studies that show that Turkish membership will not have 
considerable negative impact on the ability of a reformed EU to act.289 
Open-endedness 
The difference in open-endedness issue is the fact that any result other than 
succession of the negotiations would be seen as a failure for both the candidates 
and the Union in previous cases, especially the one in 2004, while this kind of 
failure is seen as an openly desired result by many Europeans, including the 
French president and the German Chancellor, in the Turkish case. Unfortunately, 
renaming failure by inventing concepts like “privileged partnership” does not 
change the essence of the issue in the eyes of Turks. For the Turkish government, 
it is not really easy to convince the Turkish public to try to adopt all EU acquis 
while European leaders keep offering Turkey a status, i.e. privileged partnership, 
which does not even exist in the acquis. Another point that necessitates attention 
is the frequency of usage of this term by European leaders in terms of Turkish 
membership negotiations. 
 
Misinformation 
Another point that is pretty hard for Turkey to understand is why many people in 
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Europe open debates about taking in other countries like Russia, Ukraine, Israel or 
even Japan if Turkey is accepted. In addition to mentioning the long and close 
history between Turkey and EU, the Commission replies to such claims by saying 
that “EU has never offered a membership perspective” to these countries and 
decisions about Turkey has been taken unanimously.290 
Another reason for opposing Turkey’s membership is its poor population. This 
position tends to ignore the latest developments in Turkish economy. It is 
generally accepted that the economic success is impressive. In a report recently 
released by Goldman Sachs, a US-based investment banking and securities firm, 
Turkey is even predicted to be the ninth largest economy in the world with 6 
trillion $ nominal GDP, moving ahead of countries such as Japan, Germany, Italy, 
France and Canada in forty years. In parallel to its total economic growth, per 
capita income in Turkey is envisaged to be the tenth largest in the world by 
2050.291 
Many people also say that Turkey will be a problem with its large agricultural 
society. One wrong image about the Turkish expectations from the membership is 
the perception that Turks are really dreaming about taking a big share from the 
CAP. Not many people, especially farmers, even heard about CAP in Turkey. 
That is not the real concern for Turks. It seems to be better for Europeans to 
question what their answer will be if Turkey proposes to abolish all these funds. 
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Will it be the Turkish farmers or the French farmers who will resist this proposal 
more?  
 
4.2.7 On the Eastern Side of Bosporus 
Turkish public is becoming increasingly indignant towards the EU because of the 
perception that Europeans are not keeping their promises and applying double-
standards against Turkey. This anger is making it harder for the government to 
introduce reforms and slowing down the negotiation process. This point is 
emphasised by European Commission Vice-President Günter Verheugen, in an 
interview when he warned that “Europe is sending Turkey almost exclusively 
negative signals.” He continued that “we are focusing on the weaknesses of the 
country and not encouraging them to change. This is feeding a reluctance to make 
the reforms we are asking for, which in turn leads Europe to the view that the 
Turks simply can’t manage it.” According to him, this “is a dangerous spiral that 
threatens to lead to a global political failure of the highest order.”292  
Like many other analysts Amanda Akcakoca observes that “the national 
consensus on Europe is fading away, with every reform being portrayed as a 
concession to the Union.”293 For those in Turkey who oppose EU membership, the 
main reasons are fears about losing sovereignty, territorial integrity or Turkish 
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culture/religion, the belief that Europeans hate Turks and ‘they play with us’ 
perception. Some also think that Brussels is much far away to Turks and some do 
not see a desirable future in the Union. 
This situation is exploited by some Turkish politicians in order to block the 
reforms leading to EU membership. Many of them blame foreigners including 
Europeans for Turkey’s own problems and mistakes. Many tend to picture 
reforms as concessions to Europeans. Many others seem to forget that it is Turkey 
who applied for membership and show what Europeans do as a reason to stop 
introducing reforms that are in the interest of Turkey.  
 
4.2.8 Implications for JDP 
The EU may be perceived as a social group, as a ‘social group’ is defined by 
Turner as “one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they 
relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms 
and values.”294 As it is well known from the example of the EU, only those who 
meet the required criteria can become a member to a particular social group. In 
other cases, problems arise for the newcomer, the old members and the social 
group as a structure. Thus, there is a vast amount of literature on the process that 
transforms the EU candidates in the negotiation process in both material and non-
material terms. It is very common to argue that enlargement is the most powerful 
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policy of the Union that is unique in its success in transferring norms in a 
relatively short period of time. EU membership negotiations are a concrete 
example of socialisation which is more institutionalised and put under schedule. 
The Union openly uses social influence methods and conditionality principle. 
As mentioned in the introduction part, EU has been the most important external 
factor that shaped JDP’s evolution process, because it created a democratic 
environment within which it could push for more freedom for all, including itself. 
As Paul Cubicek mentions, although there have been political liberalisation 
demands in Turkey for many years, the real “impetus for this transformation was 
the EU’s decision in 1999 to accept Turkish candidacy for membership with the 
stipulation that Turkey would have to make numerous political reforms to gain 
eventual entry into the organization.”295 Ziya Öniş points out this fact by noting 
that the EU has started a new “period of profound and momentous change in 
Turkish history … [that] would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful 
and highly institutionalized EU anchor in the direction of full membership.”296 
This situation was reinforced by the fact that Islamists, in general, has seen EU 
membership process as a path toward “de-Kemalisation” and thus greater 
religious freedom.297  
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It is well-known that Islamic identity in Turkey was strengthened by “European 
snubs in the past, which were seen as evidence of a double standard with regard to 
Muslims.” 298 However, today the credible prospect of EU membership is believed 
to lead Islamists, the grassroots of JDP, in a liberal direction. This was another 
face of the impact of EU on JDP’s identity formation process. 
Although EU membership process seems to open a manoeuvre space for JDP in 
Turkish politics, there is a continuous debate on its sincerity in its commitment to 
this process. Yet, it is generally believed or assumed by both domestic and foreign 
observers that JDP, at least in a pragmatic way, wants full membership. Moreover, 
most of the observers think that, as Greek scholars Lega and Agapi Glyptis 
mention, JDP “more actively and vocally committed to EU accession than any of 
its predecessors” and shows its commitment to European values through 
diplomatic and other means,” as in the example of Cyprus issue.299 
JDP seems to have realised the importance of meanings and symbols in the new 
international structure. This can be understood from its choice for its symbol as a 
light bulb that is a modern and traditional symbol, which represents enlightenment 
after darkness. It is not only its symbol but also its policies that are prepared with 
this consciousness. Thus, they use identity-related and civilizational arguments as 
its main cards in its relations with the foreign world. In this respect, JDP leaders 
relate their arguments to the clash of civilizations debate. They frequently use the 
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argument that “Turkey is an answer to the clash of civilizations.”300 In this respect 
they claim that Turkey can play a vital role in relations between the Muslim world 
and the rest of the world, including the West.  
Erdoğan insists that Turkey’s membership will strengthen the position of EU in 
the world and provide the world crucial assets in its efforts to prevent any clash 
between civilizations. In his words, Turkish membership “will change the image 
of the EU in the Islamic world.” He adds, by this way “rather than an economic 
union, or a union of a certain religion, it will show it’s a union of values.” 301 
Abdullah Gül, Turkish president and former foreign minister, in continuation 
argues that a rejection from the EU about Turkey’s membership will make the 
Islamic world to believe the existence of double standard that prevents a Muslim 
country from membership whatever it does.302 Ali Babacan, Turkish foreign 
minister and chief EU negotiator, warns his European counterparts that Turkey’s 
membership process has a crucial importance for the “future of east-west 
relations.”303  
Many foreign analysts and politicians agree with these arguments.  For instance, 
in this respect, U.S. President Bush emphasizes the importance of Turkey’s EU 
membership as “a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the 
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west.”304 On the EU side, the most crucial matter related to Turkish membership is 
its possible contribution to the Union to become a global player. Turkish 
membership is agreed to contribute the Union to establish its security force and to 
“project the power of democratic ideals to troubled” regions.305 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 THEORY MEETS PRACTICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
 
Throughout the research process, showing direct relationship between dependent 
and independent variables have been the hardest part of this study. Because of the 
nature of non-material factors like emotions, ideas or perceptions, it became pretty 
hard to see how they have impacts on the dependent variables we observe in the 
aftermath of September 11 attacks. This situation created suspicion about the 
explanatory power of constructivism on the issue analysed in this dissertation. 
The main expectation from the reader of this study has been to see the relevant 
relationship between the variables, after reading the explanation of the post-9/11 
international environment and the evaluation of Turkey’s relations with the west 
in the mentioned era. However, if the expectation of the reader is to see open and 
clear links between the variables, the problems of constructivist theory begin at 
that point. 
Discussions can be widened about the methods to examine the explanatory power 
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of a theory. However, this question is well beyond the scope of this study. That 
being said, one occasional deficiency of constructivist analysis compared to its 
positivist alternatives is its lack of giving satisfaction to its readers as much as the 
latter can do. Thus, a constructivist might face a criticism about the scientific 
contribution of his/her study in understanding and explaining a subject. 
On the other hand, one obvious success of constructivist school is to persuade IR 
scholars about the necessity of paying attention to non-material factors in the 
social world. However, one should not forget the difficulties in answering 
questions such as ‘how, when, where do these non-material factors play a 
significant role?’ 
The efforts in trying to find ‘concrete’ proofs of the explanatory power of 
constructivism in the subject of this thesis well reflected the matters mentioned 
above. In order to make things easier for the analysis, Turkey’s relations with the 
West related to developments in the Middle East have been selected as a test area 
in this chapter. The influences of non-material factors (i.e. ideas, perceptions, 
emotions) have been searched within newspaper articles and between the 
sentences in speeches. ‘Turkish model’ discussions, Turkey’s role in the Greater 
Middle East Project and its leading position in the Alliance of Civilizations 
Initiative have been prioritised in that framework.  
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5.1 Middle East under Spotlight after 9/11 
American people, like the rest of the world, were trying to give a meaning to the 
event while watching the breaking news on 9/11 attacks. The first reaction was 
obviously shock and deep trauma.  From the very beginning, suspicion about 
Middle Eastern terrorists was mentioned. Interestingly, as in the case of 
Oklahoma bombing, pundits did not hesitate for a moment from showing Muslim 
fanatics as the ones who are responsible for the events. It was not perceived as a 
criminal attack, but a modern declaration of war on TV. Huntington’s books are 
taken back from the shelves to be read once again and his thesis about a possible 
clash of civilizations became one of the most popular topics in discussions.  
Under these circumstances, provocative arguments found open ground in the 
world media, especially in the West. One example was an interview of a respected 
British historian Sir John Keegan in an Australian radio station. His message was 
simple and clear: 
“Oh kill them (terrorists) I think. Actually get rid of, physically get rid of 
them. There’s nobody to deal with. You can’t rationalise - how can you 
reason with somebody who actually wants to die?... 
(Al-Qaida network) is very.... it’s very Islamic, but particularly very Arab - 
and you can see that it has its roots in Islamic but particularly Arab Islamic 
style of war making that goes back to the 7th century AD. The surprise 
attack... victory... killing for its own sake... 
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Islam was that funny sort of pure system of beliefs, that depressed people in 
the Middle East held as their religion - and the revival of Islam dates from 
the early years of the 20th century - no longer than that - the Arabs 
awakening. It was brought about by their humiliation... by their sense of 
how low they’d fallen compared with the West.” 306 
These kinds of analyses became so popular that some observers even started to 
think that the rhetoric of American, British and Israeli experts about 9/11 has 
become as dangerous as the terror itself.307 
Although transatlantic leaders hesitated from using the term ‘Clash of 
Civilisations,’ they all believed in the necessity to get ready for a possible clash 
with some bad people. In that framework, threat perceptions of the EU and USA 
have been one of the main commonalities between the transatlantic partners in the 
new international system after 9/11. It is not secret for anybody that September 11 
has been the decisive event shaping the foreign policy of the Bush administration. 
President Bush declared three days after the attacks, “Our responsibility to history 
is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”308 
Similar to their American allies, Europeans declared that they believe the world 
“faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.”309 
The security strategy of the Union emphasises the vitality of fighting terrorism as 
the most important threat that the world faces now. Moreover, Europeans argue 
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like their American counterparts that other important global challenges are 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as in the cases of Iran or North 
Korea, regional conflicts as in the cases of Middle East or Kashmir, failed states 
as in the cases of Afghanistan or Liberia, organised crime that includes drug and 
weapon trafficking, and maintaining energy security.310 Very few Americans are 
likely to reject this list. 
 
5.2 Civilizational Debates 
The concept of “clash of civilizations” is firstly used by Bernard Lewis who in his 
article that dates back to 1990 argues that what occurs between the West and its 
“ancient rival” Islam that is “against “(the West’s) Judeo-Christian heritage, (its) 
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both” is “no less than a clash of 
civilizations.”311 However, it is Samuel Huntington who turned the concept into 
one of the most controversial issues in the international relations literature. 
By the early years of 1990s, according to Huntington like many others, the world 
was entering a new era within which “the fundamental source of conflict... will 
not be primarily ideological or primarily ideological or primarily economic.” 
Rather, the “great divisions... and conflict(s),” he continued, “will be cultural.” In 
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this world, “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines.”312 The 
main issue in the post-Cold War period, in his words, is the “interaction between 
the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilization.”  In 
this picture, the West is supposed to remain united without any conflict. 
Many analysts have given reference to Huntington’s arguments in the aftermath of 
9/11 attacks. This increased the enthusiasm in western circles about the 
prospective ‘other’ for the West, namely the Islamic world. However, prejudices 
and misunderstandings seem to prevail in the western world, especially with the 
negative influences of terrorist with the ‘Islamist’ banner. Yet, it is important to 
mention that this problem is not a new development. In his book written in 1981, 
well-known scholar Edward Said criticises the West for taking Islam as the 
scapegoat for everything that seems to be wrong in the world system. He believes 
that there is almost unanimity in the West about the guilt of Islam about the 
problems that world faces today. In his words, “for the right, Islam represents 
barbarism; for the left, medieval theocracy; for the center, a kind of distasteful 
exoticism.” Thus, instead of starting by telling what Islam is, Said starts his book 
by saying that “Islam is not what it is generally said to be in the West today.”313 
Whether it is right or wrong, the perceptions of the Europeans and Americans 
about the Muslim world have had considerable influences in the shaping their 
actions and the East-West relations, in general. This caused transatlantic partners 
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to prioritise efforts to promote democracy and liberal values in the world, 
especially in the regions with Muslim populations. It is not an exaggeration to 
argue that democracy promotion has become one of the core tenets of their 
security strategy. The EU has used enlargement processes, its Neighbourhood 
Policy and aids, while the USA has attached importance to the Greater Middle 
East Project, in this respect. Moreover, they prepared plans to stabilise regions 
like the Middle East by integrating them into the global economic system.314 
Transatlantic partners have also determined supporting moderate actors in the 
Islamic world against radical groups as a crucial part of their strategy in the new 
environment. They have increased their efforts to find successful examples or 
models, which are moderate and liberal Muslims in this world that can provide a 
better alternative for Muslims than armed struggle or terror. Preventing a possible 
clash of civilizations in any sense has become one of the top issues in their 
agenda.  
This situation creates another point that transatlantic allies strongly agree on: the 
importance of Turkey as an asset in their strategy in the post-9/11 world. For 
them, a stable and prosperous Turkey became a desirable target to reach in order 
to cope with new threats and to secure their interests in regions where Turkey is 
politically, economically, culturally and historically involved to. 
This approach has been strengthened with declarations from JDP government that 
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try to show Turkey shares similar interests and perceptions with its western 
partners. For instance, Egemen Bağış, Erdoğan’s foreign policy advisor, claims 
that it is a commonly observed fact that the world needs NATO more after 
September 11, not less. After mentioning the importance of cooperation and 
alliance relations between NATO members, Bağış lists a group of new threats that 
are very similar to what Turkey’s western allies claim: terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction, crimes, human-drug-weapon trafficking etc. He uses a similar 
rhetoric with other western politicians and show how strong the solidarity among 
Turkey and the western world is.315 
 
5.3 Turkey as a Model 
 
 
“Turkey has wisely dealt with the post-September 11 world.” 
Ghassan Charbel, Al-Hayat316 
 
After a period of observation, Turkey’s new leaders were welcomed by foreigners 
as a new group of hardworking politicians that deserve some credit and time.317 It 
took less than two years for Erdoğan to enter the top 100 list of Time Magazine in 
2004 as the “rarest blends in the Islamic world,” who can be described as “a 
deeply religious man with a talent for the rough and tumble of democratic 
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politics.”318  
Within a short period of time, JDP has become a party that is closely observed by 
the Islamic world. Some analysts claim that one of the main reasons for this 
attention is the fact that JDP “has become the first and only post-Islamic party.”319 
It is argued to become a political party that is carefully watched especially by the 
moderate Islamist groups as a model or a source of inspiration, although, until 
recently, it have had “and awkward relationship” with the Arab Islamist groups 
that accused it for “abandoning its Islamist principles in pursuit of power within a 
secular state.”320 The subsequent developments after the achievements of the party 
seem to support this argument. In Morocco, even a party that took the same name 
with JDP is established with its Moroccan initials PJD. Mustafa Ramid, an MP 
from PJD, says “The JDP lives under a secular umbrella- we say we’re a 
democratic party but in an Islamic state.”321 
The importance attached to Turkey’s EU membership issue among the Muslims in 
the Middle East was so high that some pundits have argued that “If Muslim 
Turkey joins Christian Europe as a full member, it would be the most important 
historical act taken during the last few centuries against the logic of the clash of 
civilizations. It would break down and dissolve the bloodiest borders, to use 
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Samuel Huntington's phrase and create common interests in belonging to a single 
space.”322 
In continuation to this understanding, Khaled el-Hroub argues that 
“Europeanization of Muslim Turkey… constitute the most important experience 
in terms of the relationship between modern Islam and the weight of western 
modernization.”323 
Haşim Salih, an Arab writer living in France, believes like many other Muslims 
that the fear of Europeans about Turkey is based on their fear of Islam. They think 
European leaders’ real concern is the Muslim population of Turkey. This 
perception gives another crucial dimension to Turkey’s EU membership issue in 
the eyes of Middle Easterners.324 
In the western academia and media, there is a growing consensus about the fact 
that JDP is the most pro-Western actor in the Turkish politics that pushes hard for 
the entry requirements of the EU, eliminates old-fashioned bureaucrats, politicians 
and politics styles, and actively takes initiative to solve chronic domestic and 
international problems of the country.325 
Contrary to arguments about confusion and mystery, it is claimed in this thesis 
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that such transformation is totally understandable if one looks at the issue through 
constructivist lenses that is explained in the second chapter, while keeping the 
post-9/11 international system that is evaluated in the subsequent chapter in mind. 
Because non-material factors, especially the changing ideas and perceptions of 
post-9/11 world, played decisive roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy under 
Justice and Development Party government. After September 11 attacks, JDP-led 
Turkey entered a period of high interaction with the international structure, as an 
agent that has been highly influenced by the developments while shaping the 
developments at the same time. In Wendt’s words, Turkey and the post-9/11 
international structure have “mutually” influenced each other. Because of the 
relative size of the structure, the impact of the structure on Turkey as an agent has 
been much more decisive.  
Although Washington traditionally had problems with pro-Islamist political 
parties, Graham Fuller argues that “Washington has come to terms quite 
successfully with the [JDP]’s power, demonstrating that at least one Islamist 
party, or party of Islamic origins, in the world can be a viable partner for the 
United States in a drive toward regional stability.”326 He adds that JDP’s “shift 
towards greater independence from Washington” in the region made “Turkey 
more a part of the Middle East than ever before.”327 Hasan Cemal argues, as a 
result of his consultations with high-level decision-makers in Washington, that 
this fact increased Turkey’s importance in the eyes of Americans, although it was 
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watched with suspicion in the early days.328 In other words, Turkey with a 
distance from Washington, rather than Turkey as a close American ally, is “more 
sympathetic to Muslim states” while “its... domestic accomplishments are viewed 
with greater sympathy and respect and thus facilitate Turkey’s serving in part as a 
regional model.”329 Although it may create some problems in the short term, it is 
commonly argued that this situation is also in the interest of the USA. This 
position seems to be reinforced with the active role played by Turkey recently as a 
mediator on highly sensitive issues in its region. New Turkey seems to be able to 
successfully broker talks between countries like Israel and Syria, USA and Iran 
and recently Russia and Georgia.330  
Graham Fuller, more recently, claimed that Turkey became a regional power for 
the first time in a century by applying its own independent foreign policy in its 
neighbouring regions. According to him, although cooperation is still possible and 
existent, Turkey and USA are no more allies. For him, after decades of pretension 
as if no one exists in the eastern and southern part of Turkey, Ankara now accepts 
it also has a “Middle Eastern” identity. This gives a different image to Ankara in 
the eyes of Middle Easterners that begin to see Turkey as a gate to the outside 
world.331 
Discussions about “Turkish model” date back to 1990s in the aftermath of the 
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Cold War. In a speech Anthony Blinkmen, former U.S. President Clinton’s 
Special Assistant and Senior Director for European Affairs at the National 
Security Council said “Turkey sits at the crossroads--or, if you prefer, atop the 
fault-lines--of the world. Because of its place, because of its history, because of its 
size and strength, and most important, because of what it is--a nation of mainly 
Islamic faith that is secular, democratic and modernizing--Turkey must be a leader 
and can be a role model for a large swath of the world.”332 
Within this framework, as Meliha Benli Altunışık mentions, Turkish model notion 
“re-emerged more forcefully” after 9/11.333 One example she gives in that respect 
is American President George W. Bush’s speech in NATO’s Istanbul Summit in 
June 2004 within which he stated that he appreciates the example that Turkey has 
set on “to be a Muslim country which embraces democracy, rule of law and 
freedom.” He expressed his admiration about Turkey’s record of development and 
recommended the country as a "model" for the rest of the Muslim world.334 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, former president, and Hilmi Özkök, former Chief of Staff, 
told to American authorities in every occasion that Turkey should not be 
presented as a model or an example in any way.335 However, in Erdoğan’s 
Washington visit in 2005, American President Bush did not hesitate to repeat that 
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Turkey’s democracy is an important example for the peoples of the Middle East 
while thanking for Erdoğan’s leadership in that respect. During the visit, parties 
declared that they perceive the Greater Middle East Project as an opportunity to 
improve Turkish-American relations and promised supporting each other.336 
Sociologist Nilüfer Göle supports Turkish model argument by claiming that 
“global terror symbolised by September 11, authoritarian-theocratic structure 
identified with Iranian Revolution, chaotic instances like Algeria or Taliban 
movement... Alternative to all these can come from Turkey and JDP. We can 
observe only in Turkey that radical Islamist movements can follow a different 
path than terror or theocracy. A ‘good-humored’ Islam is arising in Turkey.”337 
Various writers like Erdal Güven, argued that not Turkey but JDP itself is a 
source of inspiration for the reformists in the Middle East who defend democracy 
in their region. In his words, Turkey perception of the Muslim world has changed 
after JDP came to power as an Islamist-rooted movement. JDP strengthened the 
hands of reformers in the Middle East as an example, as a reference party, as a 
success story...338 
At the Congress of Democrats from the Islamic world in Istanbul, a former 
Yemeni foreign minister showed how such opinions are perceived in some 
segments of the Arab world: “It was a conscious choice to hold this meeting in 
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Turkey. The (Turkish) Islamic movement embraced the secular state. This new 
experience in Turkey is a model for all Muslim countries.”339 
Turkey’s decisions not to allow American forces to use Turkish territory to invade 
Iraq or Erdoğan’s criticism about the violence applied by Israel against 
Palestinians are seen as bold behaviours of JDP-led Turkey. Some Arabs base this 
boldness on the fact that JDP, contrary to Arab governments, came to power with 
democratic means. Thus, they believe that there is a “lesson” to be learnt there.340 
Ghassan Charbel explains how JDP-led Turkey seems through Middle Eastern 
eyes by describing Turkey as a close US ally who can oppose US invasion of Iraq, 
a state that claims membership of the European club, while being “equally planted 
in the Middle East,” a mediator who makes sure to maintain the ability to talk to 
all sides, including Israel, in a “sick and turbulent region.”341 
After September 11 attacks, the main priority of the Western actors became to 
combat international terrorism and marginalise terrorist groups by clearly 
separating their ideologies from Islam as a religion. All parties agree on the 
unique role that can be played by Turkey in such efforts. Even if JDP leaders, in 
the words of Ahmet Davutoğlu, claim that “neither Turkey as a country, nor [JDP] 
as a political party, wants to be a model for anyone,”342 JDP-led Turkey is 
implicitly or explicitly seen by all parties as the most promising model for 
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disproving terrorist groups’ claims on a potential clash between Islam and western 
values.343 This seems to be in line with the common expectation to see more 
liberal-democratic regimes in the region that are economically and politically 
integrated to the global system. Abdullah Gül’s call for democratisation in Tehran 
Summit of the Islamic Conference Organization was seen as one of the first steps 
taken by the government to answer the calls for being a model.344 
Within this framework, it can be argued that JDP found a perfect environment for 
its “proactive”345 foreign policy understanding in the post-9/11 international 
structure. In other words, the changes at the systemic level enabled JDP to realise 
its plan to transform Turkey into a “pivotal country” from a passive bridge 
country in the region that has long been perceived “as having strong muscles, a 
weak stomach, a troubled heart and a mediocre brain.”346 This understanding 
found its place in five main pillars of JDP-led Turkey’s foreign policy that were 
listed by Davutoğlu as: maintaining a sensitive balance between security concerns 
and protecting civil liberties; applying “zero-problem policy” toward Turkey’s 
neighbours; developing close relations with neighbouring regions and beyond; 
adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy; and applying a “rhythmic 
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diplomacy” instead of a static one.347 
This perceptional environment opened the way for close cooperation between 
Turkey and USA in the Middle East within the framework of Washington-led 
Greater Middle East Initiative, which mainly aims to “combat the appeal of 
Islamist extremism” by promoting political and economic liberalism in the 
Muslim world.348 This situation makes perfect sense in the post-9/11 security 
perceptions of the Western powers. Although Turkish secular elites reject 
identification of Turkey as a “moderate Islamic” country and emphasize its 
secular characteristics, it is seen by the West, especially U.S., as a model country 
in the Initiative that could have harmonised Islam with democracy.349 JDP leaders 
do not seem to be uncomfortable with such views. Rather, they use these kinds of 
arguments in their rhetoric.  
JDP also officially reflected such understanding in its foreign policy strategy. One 
prominent example is the famous initiative named Alliance of Civilizations that is 
co-sponsored by Tayyip Erdoğan and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the prime 
minister of Spain, under the auspices of the United Nations.350 The initiative 
started in 2005 upon the proposal of Zapatero at the 59th General Assembly of the 
UN and continued with several meetings and a comprehensive report that analyses 
the current situation in the relations between the Muslim and the Western worlds 
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while providing solution suggestions.351  
 
5.4 Greater Middle East Initiative 
At the end of the Sea Island Summit in June 2004, G-8 countries committed 
themselves “to a Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the 
governments and peoples of the Broader Middle East and North Africa.” They 
claimed that this partnership would be based on “genuine cooperation with the 
region’s governments, as well as business and civil society representatives to 
strengthen freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all.”352 
Along with Yemen and Italy, Turkey became co-sponsor of Democracy 
Assistance Dialogue that is planned to bring governments, civil society groups 
and other organizations together. In the official web-site of Turkish Foreign 
Ministry, it is declared that Turkey has been negatively affected by the instability 
in the Middle East and has a strong interest in the resolution of its problems. In 
the same page, it is offered to share Turkey’s “valuable and unique experience” 
with its Middle Eastern neighbours. Turkey’s participation to the G-8 Summit in 
Sea Island as a democratic partner and its co-chairmanship of Democracy 
Assistance Dialogue is evaluated in that framework.353 Some writers even thought 
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that Ankara’s participation to the Summit is a signal of Turkey entering the 
‘giants’ league.’354 The main objectives of the meetings are to: 
Coordinate and share information and lessons learned on democracy programs in 
the region, taking into account the importance of local ownership and each 
country’s particular circumstances; work to enhance existing democracy programs 
or initiate new programs; provide opportunities for participants to develop joint 
activities, including twinning projects; promote and strengthen democratic 
institutions and processes, as well as capacity-building; foster exchanges with 
civil society groups and other organizations working on programs in the region. 
355
 
The Project has been perceived to aim finishing global terror by bringing 
democracy to the Greater Middle East region. This understanding was argued to 
be a transformed version of democratic peace theory that foresees democracies do 
not go to war with each other. The Project was argued to increase the importance 
of Turkey in the international system.356 
Martin Beck argues that the real motivation behind the Greater Middle East 
Project is based on the security interest perceptions of Western actors. The target 
of democratisation in the region was not for the sake of any humanitarian reason. 
But, it is more a result of a search for eliminating security threats emerging from 
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the region by means of a transformed understanding of “democratic peace” 
theory. In other words, Beck believed that the Project had a good chance of 
success because of being “motivated by… self-interest” of Westerners.357 
According to Çağaptay, Turkey’s importance increased with the Project that is a 
product of post-9/11 world. Terrorist bombings in İstanbul, in Çağaptay’s words, 
convinced U.S. President that Turkey is among the good actors and is a target of 
bad actors. Interesting point made by Çağaptay is that moderate Islam model is 
the vision of JDP, although many people in Washington administration have 
reservations about Turkey’s ability to be a model for the Middle East.358 
Erdoğan has been willing to participate in the Project and play a central role from 
the very beginning. In his Washington visit, he warned President Bush that if they 
exclude Turkey from the Project, all attempts would be resisted within the region. 
This was a clear message to ask for an active role in the Project.359 Erdoğan also 
declared that Turkey is in the international front that was created for fighting 
against terrorism and all kinds of radicalism after September 11.360 
He claimed that the question was not whether democracy is possible in the Middle 
East, or not. The real question was how the demand of the peoples of Middle East 
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for democracy can be met.361 Thus, he asked the help of USA and EU for turning 
the democracy demand in the region into a political will and concrete process. In 
other words, he wanted the Western world to listen to democracy demands from 
the Muslim world. He showed the benefits of Turkey’s interaction with the 
outside world during its own democratisation process.362 
In Erdoğan’s words, participants of the G-8 Summit in Sea Island presented their 
will to support the Middle East’s transformation into a region of peace, wealth and 
modernity. According to diplomats, USA, Germany, Italy, France and UK 
unanimously believed in the importance of Erdoğan’s presence in a Summit 
where Middle East’s reformation issue is discussed. Another important point 
about the Summit was the influence of Erdoğan’s speeches in shaping the 
documents produced at the end of the summit the Summit.363 
Abdullah Gül, former foreign minister and current president, declared that Greater 
Middle East Project was compatible with Turkey’s foreign policy aims and 
principles. In that framework, he expressed that Turkey does not have any 
reservations for the Project initiatives for political, economic and social reforms in 
the Middle East. Rather, he continued, Turkey has been supporting such views for 
the region for a long time.364 After stressing the importance of freedom in the 
Muslim world, Gül mentioned that they could not have been in power if freedom 
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and democracy did not exist in Turkey.365 This approach underlines that not only 
Turkey as a country, but also JDP as a political party is an appropriate source of 
inspiration for others in the Muslim world.  
According to Davutoğlu, “Greater Middle East Project is already a late Project. 
Because the Middle East (1) could not reach economic wealth in spite of its rich 
natural resources; (2) could not offer a culture alternative to the West in spite of 
its deep rooted historical background; (3) failed in terms of political regimes in 
spite of having very old, deep rooted and considerable political customs. As a 
voice from this region, we should ask this question to ourselves: why?” 
In Davutoğlu’s words, “Turkey is not a peripheral country, but a central one. It’s 
neither EU’s nor Middle East’s periphery. Turkey can no more be identified with 
Cold War terms like ‘regional power.’366 The central country understanding that is 
continuously mentioned in Davutoğlu’s speeches aims at transforming Turkey 
into a global power that has more say in shaping international structure and its 
norms. 
Etyen Mahçupyan points out that Turkey, as the eastern brink of the western 
coalition, is facing many risks in an era within which the world is searching for a 
new order. On the other hand, he supports Davutoğlu’s argument by claiming that 
this situation gives many opportunities that can be used if Ankara can apply 
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proactive policies and take initiatives.367 
This changing perception of Turkey as an active player in its region found support 
from different segments of western and eastern world, at least as far as the Middle 
East is concerned. For instance, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair believes 
that Turkey has a unique position in the Middle East that can be trusted by both 
Israel and Palestinians at the same time. In the current world order, he claims, 
“there is far greater interest in Turkey than ever by means of its relations with the 
West and with Islam.”368 Ghassan Charbel, an Arab writer, argues that Erdoğan’s 
mission as a mediator between Israel and Syria is not an easy one. However, he 
highlights the importance of that mission by claiming that it concerns all nearby 
and remote actors including Washington, Tehran, Hezbollah and Hamas.369 
Similarly, Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado asserts, “Turkey is playing a 
vital role in the management of the complex conflicts of the Middle East.” This 
situation, in his words, changes the long-held perceptions of the country in 
Western eyes. He adds, “Turkish government is fostering new dimensions to its 
foreign policy, and this is appreciated very much in Europe. In the end we 
[Europeans] will have a new perception of the strategic importance of Turkey.”370 
Contrary to initial expectations, the things did not go smoothly for the Greater 
Middle East Project. Developments like American failure in Iraq, escalation of 
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violence in the Middle East, worsening situation in Israeli-Palestinian relations 
showed that the Project is far from achieving its goals. For many, what the Project 
brought to the region was not democracy but more blood and poverty. After a 
question about his efforts to decrease the tension between Israel and Palestine, 
Erdoğan stated that Turkey has taken a role in the Greater Middle East Project in 
order to contribute to efforts to establish a peaceful and wealthy region where 
human rights and rule of law are respected. Contrary to expectations, he 
continues, the situation in the region is worsening.371 
At the peak of Israeli military operation in Lebanon, Erdoğan gave the strongest 
negative message about the Greater Middle East Project by saying that Turkey can 
review its co-partnership in the Democracy Assistance Dialogue if the negative 
situation continues.372  
In April 2008, Erdoğan claimed that the Greater Middle East Project that was 
promoted by Washington to bring democracy to the Middle Eastern region proved 
to be unsuccessful. His arguments signalled the beginning of a new understanding 
in Turkey’s foreign policy related to the region: “The Middle East project was 
stillborn. It died as a result of the G-8’s failure -- so we have shifted our 
projection to the Alliance of Civilizations”373 
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5.5 Alliance of Civilizations 
“The complex international situation created in the wake of September 11, as well as of 
all the other terrorist attacks that constantly marked this decade, has turned dialogue 
between civilizations, religions and cultures into a humanitarian urgency that cannot be 
postponed. The Alliance of Civilizations is the right initiative, at the right time.”374 
 
Jorge Sampaio 
UN High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations 
 
As a result of the general elections held only three days after the terrorist 
bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, Luis Rodriguez Zapatero came to power 
in Spain. One of his first decisions was to call Spanish forces back from Iraq and 
to show a new way of fighting with terrorism: dialogue instead of using military 
force. The first step was his speech in the United Nations General Assembly on 21 
October 2004, within which he called for an alliance between western and Muslim 
civilisations. On the suggestion of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to 
cooperate with a Muslim country, Zapatero proposed co-sponsorship of the 
project to Turkey in July 2005. Ankara accepted the proposal and the initiative 
was officially announced to start on 14 July 2005. After that point, Turkey 
promoted the initiative in every international platform. In spite of the lack of 
interest in the early days, the international support to the initiative increased 
substantially in the coming months. 
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A report was submitted by the “High Level Group” to the UN Secretary General 
Sampaio and co-sponsor prime ministers Erdoğan and Zapatero on 13 November 
2006 at the final meeting of the high level group in İstanbul. The following points 
are highlighted: For instance, the report states that the origin of the existing 
tension between the Western and Muslim societies should be searched in the 
political incidents of near past, not in the history or any religion. Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has an important role in that respect. Moreover, the report 
criticises the military operations of western powers in the Muslim world for 
deepening fear and enmity. The report also emphasises the existence of some un-
progressive forces as a result of fragmentation in Islam.375 
After receiving the report, the Secretary-General highlighted the important role 
played by non-material elements in the problems that we face now and said: “We 
need to get away from stereotypes, generalizations and preconceptions, and take 
care not to let crimes committed by individuals or small groups dictate our image 
of an entire people, an entire region, or an entire religion.”376 
In Mahmood Ayub’s words, the alliance aims to strengthen mutual understanding 
among different civilisations; counteract the influence of those elements 
promoting intolerance; recommend practical measures to lower the risks to world 
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stability stemming from these extremist tendencies; promote the idea that global 
cooperation is indispensable to security, stability and development.377 
In his speech at the start of the Alliance of Civilizations meeting in Madrid, Ban 
Ki-moon, UN Secretary General, argued that dialogue is the slow but sure way to 
fight against the “terrifying” threats we face in the new world order. According to 
him, “never in our lifetime has there been a more desperate need for constructive 
and committed dialogue, among individuals, among communities, among 
cultures, among and between nations.”378 
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, called the countries participating in the Alliance of Civilizations 
Initiative to put forward their political will and warned that the contributions 
should not be merely academic if the real aim is to build peace in the world.379 
U.S. State Secretary Rice pointed out that the Initiative, like the Greater Middle 
East Project, “promises to encourage greater understanding and promote 
democratic reform, peace and stability in the broader Middle East.” For this 
reason, she added that they can support the Initiative projects as far as they are 
“compatible with” Washington’s “own program goals for the Middle East 
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regions.” 380 
The alliance’s Group of Friends consists of dozens of governments as well as 
multilateral organizations including the European Commission and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that support the mission of the 
alliance. Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado shows his trust in the Alliance 
of Civilizations Initiative by arguing that the Initiative is a helpful means in 
“avoiding a rupture between civilizations.” The number of states joining the 
initiative and UN support is clear signs of success. 381 Similarly, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ali Babacan said the “growing confidence in and support for the 
Alliance of Civilizations is strong evidence of the determination among nations 
for maintaining cooperation and reconciliation instead of conflict.”382 
In April 2007, Ki-moon appointed former Portugal President Jorge Sampaio to the 
office of High Representative of the Alliance of Civilizations. Sampaio described 
the High Representative as a kind of coordinator organising relations among 
governments, NGOs, universities and institutions such as the European Council. 
The Alliance of Civilizations concentrates on four fields: education, youth, media 
and immigrants. For situations like the Cartoon Crisis in 2005, an Emergency 
Intervention Mechanism will be in force that is another point Sampaio. This 
mechanism suggests ambassadors of the Alliance of Civilizations to write articles 
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or to show up in media organs such as radio and television in crises and act in a 
way to stop the crisis.383 
The Initiative was received with excitement in Turkish media. Some even named 
it as a “Turkish stamp” on the world society.384 Common expectation from the co-
sponsorship was to increase Turkey’s influence in the international arena.385 
Pundits like Sami Kohen argued that this Initiative would not harm Turkey’s place 
in Europe and should be seen as an opportunity for Turkey.386 Reactions 
concerning new perception of Turkey supported such views. For instance, it is 
believed by many, as Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado asserts, Turkey 
has a new role in the post-9/11 international environment. He explains this 
situation with a constructive manner and claims that this is a product of both the 
changing “perceptions of the European people of the importance of the Middle 
East for their security and that of their children” and of the active diplomacy of 
the Justice and Development Party.387 
The Initiative has interesting aspect for Turkish foreign policy: Although it had 
similar experiences in regional organisations such as Baghdad Pact or 
Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Alliance of Civilizations is 
the first global initiative that Turkey has taken a leading role.  
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Abdullah Gül emphasised the risk of “estrangement between different cultures 
and religions” in his speech in the UN General Assembly and promised “Turkey 
will continue to be a leading country that will help [Alliance of Civilizations] 
achieve its goals.”388 In his words, Turkey is “an interface that promotes dialogue 
and harmony among different cultures and religions” and has a crucial role for 
that reason.389 
In his speech at the Khartoum Summit of the Arab League on 28 March 2006, 
Erdoğan stressed the importance of new circumstances that the world faces, which 
“require international cooperation and solidarity more than ever.” In his words, 
“with its multi-faced relations, rich history and cultural assets, [Turkey] feels a 
special responsibility to actively participate in efforts to maintain dialogue and 
mutual understanding between different cultures.”390 
Ankara used similar arguments in order to ask for a seat in the UN Security 
Council. In an article he also pledged that Turkey will attempt to bring [the] 
perspective [of Alliance of Civilizations] into the work of the Security Council, if 
Turkey is elected to have a non-permanent seat.391 
Turkey paid prominent attention in establishing a bridge between the Alliance of 
Civilizations concept and Turkey’s EU membership issue. In that context, in his 
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London visit, Erdoğan claimed that Turkey’s EU membership would mean that 
Alliance of Civilizations would occur in the European Union.392 In a similar way, 
he asserted that the EU cannot become a world power without Alliance of 
Civilizations and the Union will take the support of 1.5 billion Muslims after 
Turkey’s membership.393 
According to Veniamin Popov, the main reason for Turkey to take a leading role 
in the Initiative is obvious: Turkey wants to join the EU and it wants to “project 
the image of an ‘enlightened’ Muslim country, tolerant and drawn to the West.”394 
Turkey’s participation to the initiative has been mainly because of its ‘oriental’ 
and ‘Islamic’ character. Thus, in spite of genuine efforts for EU membership, the 
initiative became one of the departure points from the traditional “western 
country” image of Turkey.395 This can be seen as a continuation of a perception 
change in the government about the place of Turkey in the global picture. 
Davutoğlu, Erdoğan’s chief policy advisor, explains this transformation by 
describing Turkey as a “central country... [that] holds an optimal place in the 
sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa 
through the Eastern Mediterranean.”396 This perspective might be seen 
contradictory to the EU membership goal of JDP. However, the Party leadership 
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thinks that Turkey has more chance to find a plausible place in the western world 
with this perspective, instead of claiming to be an ordinary European country, 
when everybody knows Turkey certainly is not so. This understanding caused the 
Party to “increasingly capitalize on its Eastern identity with a view to securing its 
place within the West.”397 Davutoğlu explains this situation by pointing Turkey’s 
unique multiple-identity out by claiming that “Turkey can be European in Europe 
and eastern in the East, because we are both.”398 
Such efforts have been among the steps taken by JDP in reading the new 
international structure correctly and taking an active role in post-9/11 world by 
benefiting from the expectations of Western powers from Turkey in the new 
international structure. At this point, it seems crucial to highlight some 
intersection points in the new security understandings and interest perceptions of 
Turkey and other western agents. In spite of some disagreements on methods, all 
parties seem to agree on the main global challenges that should be addressed in 
the post-9/11 world. In this direction, they prioritise maintaining stability and 
security in the neighbouring regions of Turkey as a goal in the new international 
structure, especially in the Greater Middle Eastern Region. Establishing EU-like 
Kantian security regions that replace already existing Hobbesian environment in 
the region seems to be on top of the goal lists in their foreign policy agendas.399 
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So far, Turkey has shown a great willingness to be part of a dialogue between 
civilizations. In addition to co-sponsorship of Alliance of Civilizations, Ankara 
did not hesitate to take additional steps in the same direction. One example was 
the First Meeting of Civilizations that has been organized in Hatay with the high 
participation from Muslim, Christian and Jewish religious communities in 2005. 
Erdoğan called for cooperation among civilizations and openly condemned all 
kinds of terror in his opening speech. He also criticized those who use the concept 
of ‘Islamist terrorism’ after September 11.400  
The structure and nature of the Initiative is still under construction. The next 
forum of the Alliance of Civilizations will be held in İstanbul in April 2009. And 
it is still early to talk about the fate of the Initiative. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis concludes that non-material factors in the social world are 
indispensable parts of a complete story that claims to understand and explain the 
post-9/11 world in a comprehensive way. Material factors are not sufficient alone 
to analyse the systemic developments after the September 11 attacks. Even in the 
issue of ‘war’ that is one of the main issues that rationalist theories are assertive to 
explain, non-material factors play crucial roles as in the example of the Iraqi war. 
Even if one can easily argue that the neo-cons in the Bush administration shaped 
their policies mostly in line with rationalist school. Perceptions, ideas and even 
emotions were decisive in the support for these policies that enabled the Bush 
administration to realize its plans. 
This study also concludes that the appropriateness of social constructivist analysis 
in analysing the foreign policy behaviours of states is obvious, especially in 
transformation periods that create a break with the past. Understanding the JDP 
and its policies is almost impossible if one only pays attention to material factors 
in the system or domestic developments. However, if the neglected part of the 
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story is taken into consideration (namely, non-material systemic developments) it 
becomes easier to make sense of JDP’s performance and policy direction that is 
closer to the western capitals than any time in the history of the young republic. 
This thesis also concludes that constructivist theory faces considerable challenges 
in meeting the expectations of readers who look for concrete and clearly 
observable relationship between dependent and independent variables in a study. 
This arises mostly because of the non-visibility of non-material factors that 
constructivist school focuses on. This shows that constructivist analysis should be 
more precise on how the non-material elements in the social world interact with 
other material elements. 
Another conclusion reached with this study is the fact that ‘systemic analysis’ of 
Wendt may suffer from its ignorance of domestic factors, especially in cases 
where systemic impacts are less influential. Although it has been pretty useful in 
explaining Turkish foreign policy in the first years of JDP government, it seems to 
be inadequate in dealing with periods where domestic developments are dominant 
in shaping the political, economic and social landscape of Turkey. 
That being said, although it is impossible to ignore the importance of domestic 
politics and developments in shaping the international norms, interest perceptions 
and foreign policy decisions, this thesis claims that systemic developments 
deserve close attention. In order to narrow the gap in the literature, it seems as a 
fruitful path to reconsider the importance of systemic developments and the non-
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material factors in more detail in the future studies. On the other hand, more 
efforts seem to be necessary to systemize the processes that lead to construction of 
non-material elements in the international system. The complexity of human 
relations makes it harder to create well-defined rules or blueprints for analysts in 
this respect. Time will tell whether these kinds of efforts are impossible (or 
unnecessary) to succeed. 
As it has been mentioned at the beginning of this study, the disastrous attacks on 
11 September 2001 signalled the beginning of a new era within which more 
people believe that Islam is in conflict with the West and western values. 
However, although Islamic political identity was traditionally based on opposition 
to the West and the westernization processes in Turkey, as İhsan Dağı mentions, 
rapprochement between the pro-Islamist groups and western values occurred, 
ironically in the same era.401 The establishment and the rise of Justice and 
Development Party is seen by many observers as an evidence for this 
transformation in the position of the segments of Turkish society with religious 
concerns. 
Political Islam in Turkey is a result of a process that led to the creation of symbols 
and an Islamic identity. For many domestic and foreign analysts, Turkey’s Islam 
is different from the Islam of Arabs or the Persians. It can be argued that the 
reflection of Islam on Turkish politics is different from its counterparts around the 
Muslim world. This fact has a serious place in understanding JDP’s identity and 
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its reflections on its foreign policies. 
The Erdoğan government, elected on 3 November 2002, continued and reinforced 
the reform process that started after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, in which 
Turkey was declared as a candidate country. It faced some important foreign 
policy issues after it came to power, like the Iraqi invasion of USA or the Cyprus 
issue. In most of these cases JDP’s identity and background have played a crucial 
role in its foreign policy formation. In addition to agreeing on this role, this thesis 
argues that these events also had considerable impacts on JDP’s identity 
formation process. 
There is a commonly shared argument that western support for moderate Islamist 
political parties can strengthen their commitment to political and economic 
liberalization, as seen in the example of Turkey. This argument can be reinforced 
by the observation that JDP seems to be a product of “an evolving Turkish 
Islamist tradition that has grown ever more moderate as it has moved closer to the 
realities of politics and the requirements of pragmatism, especially under the 
watchful eye of the militant secularism of the army and old elite structure.”402 
The political and economic conditionality attached to Turkey’s EU membership 
also played a crucial role in shaping JDP-led Turkey’s identity and interest 
perception by drawing the lines for its manoeuvre space in Turkish politics. As in 
the example of headscarf issue, the West showed its limits of being used by JDP 
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as a tool to overcome the dominance of civil and military bureaucracy. In another 
example, namely the so-called adultery issue, Europeans moved in line with the 
secular elites and forced JDP to step back. 
It can be argued that instead of applying strict principles arising from its identity 
in its foreign policy, JDP acts pragmatically and tries to understand its limits. For 
instance, the famous 1 March decision was not a result of conscious policy-
making process. The leading figures of the party, including Erdoğan, were 
surprised about the result. However, its impact on its following actions and 
position about the issue cannot be denied. 
There is a continuous debate on JDP’s identity and ideology. Erdoğan identifies 
JDP as a broad-based, conservative democrat party. This concept is new for the 
political science literature. It can be seen as part of an identity formation effort of 
a party that had to enter elections in only one year after its establishment. Thus it 
is far from being mature and sufficient to explain JDP’s ideology. Some observers 
see it as a useful effort while others argue that instead of searching for a new 
concept, JDP should accept that it is a ‘Muslim democrat’ party. Some others 
argue that it is more like a European social-democratic party with a commitment 
to EU-related reforms. Moreover, JDP is also seen more liberal than the mainline 
parties on many issues. All these views have some right points and, even after six 
years in the government, JDP’s identity formation is far from complete. Time will 
tell how JDP’s search for its identity and ideology will end. Yet, it is obvious that 
Turkey’s relations with the outside world will continue having considerable 
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impacts on this journey while being affected by it, in return. 
In general terms, it is fair to argue that JDP seems to have made a successful 
analysis of the new international environment of the post-9/11 world. It has 
pragmatically used the perceptions of the major agents in the structure and 
positioned itself accordingly. It has benefited from not only the commonalities but 
also the differences between major western powers, mainly the EU and USA. In 
general terms, Turkey is believed to have a new role in the post-9/11 international 
environment. This situation is a product of not only the changing perceptions of 
the main actors in the post-9/11 international system, but also the active 
diplomacy of the Justice and Development Party. 
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